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Two Farm Animal Sanctuary Models and Their Potential to Provide Justice to Domestic Animals in Past, Present, and Future

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For the Animals

Abstract

Farm animal sanctuaries are places of refuge for formerly farmed animals that offer a safe and permanent home to them. Considering that agricultural practices are deeply unjust towards the domesticated animals that they concern, farm animal sanctuaries have the unique opportunity to act as a counterweight and provide their resident animals with justice. It is unclear, however, whether and to what extent they actively promote justice. Therefore, in this thesis I compare two farm animal sanctuary models that were proposed by philosophers Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2015a) and function as analytic constructs to analyze sanctuary practices. I will first outline the *refuge + advocacy* model, which puts an emphasis on providing a safe haven and advocating on the behalf of farm animals, followed by the i*ntentional community* model, which prioritizes the residents' ability to forge their own ways of living within a flexible community of humans and other animals. Both models will then be compared with regard to their capacity to provide justice to domestic animals across three temporal dimensions: past, present, and future. To cover the dimension of the past, I will scrutinize these two sanctuary models' capacity to provide resident animals with compensation for the injustices endured in their past, as well as moral repair and symbolic compensation for anonymous victims of animal agriculture. The chapter on the present will be concerned with current residents' well-being and how an objective list theory can be used to ground these animals' interest in a life that contains freedom, friendship, political participation, and meaning. Finally, how we, as humans, should live with domestic animals in the future is the topic of the last main chapter, in which I review and reject arguments for 'extinctionism' and propose how the *intentional community* model's principles could be applied to a broader conception of sanctuary: interspecies communities. I conclude that both models are able to provide their residents with justice, but that there are also relevant differences in the extent to which each can achieve this goal.

Zusammenfassung

Lebenshöfe sind Orte der Zuflucht für Tiere, die landwirtschaftlich genutzt wurden und bieten diesen ein sicheres und dauerhaftes Zuhause. Unter Berücksichtigung, dass landwirtschaftliche Praktiken zutiefst ungerecht gegenüber den Tieren sind, die sie betreffen, haben Lebenshöfe eine einzigartige Gelegenheit als ein Gegengewicht zu fungieren und ihren tierlichen Bewohnenden Gerechtigkeit zu bieten. Es ist jedoch unklar, ob und in welchem Ausmaß sie sich aktiv für Gerechtigkeit einsetzen. Deshalb werden in dieser Thesis zwei Lebenshofmodelle verglichen, welche von Donaldson und Kymlicka (2015a) eingebracht wurden und die als analytische Konstrukte dienen, um Lebenshofpraktiken zu analysieren. Dazu wird zuerst das *Zufluchts + Fürsprache* Modell vorgestellt, welches den Schwerpunkt darauf legt einen Zufluchtsort zu bieten und sich für die Belange von "Nutztieren" einzusetzen, gefolgt vom *Intentionale Gemeinschaft* Modell, welches die Befähigung der Bewohnenden priorisiert, ihre eigene Art in einer flexiblen Gemeinschaft von Menschen und anderen Tieren zu leben zu formen. Beide Modelle werden dann im Hinblick auf ihr Vermögen domestizierten Tieren Gerechtigkeit über drei temporale Dimensionen zu bieten verglichen: Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft. Im Kapitel 'Vergangenheit' wird sowohl die Kapazität beider Lebenshofmodelle untersucht ihren Bewohnenden Entschädigung für Ungerechtigkeiten ihrer Vergangenheit anzubieten als auch das Konzept der moralischen Instandsetzung und die symbolische Entschädigung für anonyme Opfer tierlicher Landwirtschaft. Das Kapitel 'Gegenwart' befasst sich mit dem Wohlergehen derzeitiger Bewohnender und damit, wie eine objektive-Liste-Theorie genutzt werden kann, um das Interesse von diesen Tieren zu grundieren, ein Leben zu führen welches Freiheit, Freundschaft, politische Teilhabe und Sinn beinhaltet. Das Thema des letzten Kapitels ist, wie wir als Menschen zukünftig mit domestizierten Tieren zusammenleben sollten. Daher werden hier Argumente für einen 'Extinktionismus' geprüft und widerlegt und vorgeschlagen wie die Prinzipien des *Intentionale Gemeinschaft* Modells auf eine erweiterte Vorstellung von Lebenshöfen angewandt werden könnten: Zwischenartliche Gemeinschaften. Ich folgere, dass beide Modelle in der Lage sind ihren Bewohnenden Gerechtigkeit zu bieten, aber auch, dass relevante Unterschiede im Ausmaß zu welchem sie dieses Ziel erreichen können existieren.

Content

1 Introduction

Animal sanctuaries are places of refuge for animals who have been subject to violence, exploitation, neglect, or other harms. There is an array of different types of sanctuaries for different kinds of animals, for example sanctuaries for companion animals, exotic or wild species, or for those animals commonly used for the production of foodstuffs and other commodities, also called farm animals[1] (Abrell 2016: 57). In this thesis, we will focus on farm (or farmed) animal sanctuaries (henceforth FASes). FASes are places that offer a safe and permanent home to individuals of those species that are commonly raised and killed at farms and slaughterhouses in order to supply milk, eggs, meat, and other products. Therefore, whenever I use the terms 'domestic' animals or 'domesticated' animals, in this thesis, I refer to turkeys, ducks, chickens, cows and cattle, pigs, horses, goats, sheep, and others who are primarily kept to supply humans with materials that come from or are their bodies. At FASes, however, these animals do not have to produce anything or fulfill any other purpose and can instead live the remainders of their lives more or less as they wish. Additionally, these sanctuaries advocate for an end to animal farming by highlighting the individuality of their resident animals and showing visitors how domesticated animals would like to live if given the chance. They are usually also present at different events concerned with animal rights topics and on social media to spread the message that farm animals are sentient beings worthy of respect and of living their lives not only to the fullest, but also until their natural end.

The paths that lead former farm animals to sanctuaries are varied, including animals who escaped from slaughter, were freed from farm animal experimentation laboratories, or were lucky to have found a human collaborator who did not want them to be killed and instead found them a spot at a sanctuary. While residents'[2] stories differ, most of them share that they

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[1] I am aware that the term 'farm animal' can in itself be value-laden insofar as it is oftentimes not used in a descriptive sense—referring to animals that can commonly be found on farms—but in a normative way to convey that these animals *should* be used as production animals. For example, when asking why many humans eat chickens but not dogs, the answer could be "because chickens are farm animals and dogs are pets". Whenever I speak of 'farm animals', I do not mean to categorize animals according to their usefulness to humans, but do so in a purely descriptive manner.

[2] Residents are those animals who live at sanctuaries.

were subject to practices that are considered common in our society—namely standard animal agricultural practices. Despite these practices being common, they are also deeply unjust. While some authors would not agree with me on this (e.g. Hsiao 2017), I think it is warranted to make this claim because the wrongness of these animal agricultural practices has been defended from many different philosophical theories, such as utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, political approaches, and others. To found my presupposition that standard animal agricultural practices are unjust, I will therefore present a brief overview of each of the four mentioned theories.

From a utilitarian perspective, philosopher Peter Singer argues that, since farm animals are able to feel pleasure and pain, they matter morally (1980: 328) and their equal interests should thus be given equal consideration (ibid.: 329). This means that in order to make the right decision in a certain situation, all interests of those involved need to be taken into account and weighed against each other, with like interests weighing equally. Giving less weight to the interest of an animal in, for example, not being confined, hurt, and killed, compared to a human's interest in consuming this animal, is to be condemned as speciesist—a term coined by Richard Ryder, which is analogous to the concepts of racism or sexism, where the interests of one group unjustifiably receive less weight than those of another group (Singer 1974: 108). To Singer, animal farming is speciesist, because "our practice of rearing and killing other animals in order to eat them is a clear instance of the sacrifice of the most important interests of other beings in order to satisfy trivial interests of our own" (ibid.). He therefore comes to the conclusion that all animal agriculture should be (gradually) abolished (Singer 1980: 334).

The deontological school of thought, or rights view, is concerned with rights and corresponding duties. Here, Tom Regan affords moral consideration to all 'subjects of a life' or beings who are "a conscious creature having an individual welfare" (1987: 186). This includes having feelings, experiences, desires, and other traits that affect the quality of someone's life (ibid.). Since farm animals belong into this category, they, like humans, have inherent value to an equal extent and should likewise be afforded rights (ibid.: 187). These include a right to life and also to bodily integrity, which are both regularly violated in the

agricultural industry through practices like castration, beak trimming, slaughter, and others. These circumstances and the fact that animals in our society are viewed and treated as mere resources lead Regan to proclaim that "[t]o right the wrong of our treatment of farm animals requires more than making rearing methods 'more humane'; it requires the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture" (ibid.: 180).

Virtue ethics does not focus on moral status, but instead relies on virtues and vices and judges humans and actions according to their virtuousness or vileness (Hursthouse 2000: 147). Therefore, with regard to animal farming, a virtue ethicist would ask whether it is a virtuous practice (Hursthouse 2006: 141) and very likely come, like Rosalind Hursthouse, to the conclusion that it is not, because "[t]he practices that bring cheap meat to our tables are cruel" (ibid.: 143), especially because they involve animal suffering (ibid.: 141). Knowing about the pain that these practices inflict and engaging in them through consuming their products, would thus express callousness, according to Hursthouse (ibid.). A virtuous person, on the other hand, would want to acquire and exercise compassion (ibid.: 142) and therefore "avoid practices that cause pain to animals and […] try to maintain their happiness" (Alvaro 2017: 21). Even if animals were not made to suffer, however, expressing the virtue of compassion would entail understanding that animals do not merely want to avoid pain, but also live and flourish (ibid.). Thus, a truly compassionate person would not support practices that entail the suffering and killing of animals, like animal farming.

Political theories, like the one proposed by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011), relate questions of animal ethics to political concepts such as political community, democracy, and citizenship (2017: 43), while asking "what sorts of relationships animals want to have with us" (ibid.: 59). To achieve this, Donaldson and Kymlicka see classic animal ethicists' focus on domestic animals' ability to suffer as insufficient and propose to also examine capacities related to the formation of bonds with other species (including humans), self-determination, and agency (ibid.: 58). Moreover, to them "justice requires supplementing this focus on passive suffering with a commitment to enabling animal agency, including the ability to co-author the terms of relationships with us" (ibid.: 49). Currently, however, farm animals are "a

subordinated class intended to serve us" (ibid.: 51) and practices related to animal agriculture do not conform with the requirements of justice, because they are "forcing animals to participate in human society on our terms, for our benefit" (2011: 10).

As I have shown by reviewing some of the most prominent positions regarding animal ethics, using and killing animals in animal agriculture means to commit an injustice against animals, even if these are kept under the very best conditions or those thought to be more 'animal-friendly'. This is the case because these farms not only account for simply a tiny fraction of animal agriculture enterprises, but because they also treat animals as a mere means to gain a certain product, violate their interests, and bar animals from exercising their agency.

In opposition to agricultural enterprises, FASes are places that protect the lives of their resident animals and cater to their interests. As outlined in the philosophical approaches above, we not only need to avoid animal suffering and respect certain rights, however, but justice also requires us to enable and respect animal agency as well as to examine how domestic animals want to live with us. In addition, being historical victims of injustice, farm animals especially are owed a just treatment. By looking at the statistics regarding the number of farm animal victims created by the agricultural system, we can only begin to fathom the extent of injustice this system perpetuates: worldwide, we kill more than 200 million land animals every day, which amounts to over 72 billion every year—making this issue even more pressing (Zampa 2020). Therefore, FASes are unique in having the opportunity to actively engage in providing at least some of these farm animals with said justice. It is unclear, however, whether and to what extent sanctuaries actually do so. Addressing this issue is important not only with regard to the individuals who live at FASes, but also when trying to change our relationship with domestic animals and create a future that is committed to treating all beings with justice. In this thesis, I will therefore compare two different models of FASes and examine different dimensions to which justice can be applied.

Sanctuaries differ in various aspects, like the degree of control that they exercise over their residents, the way in which they keep the animals, or parts of their philosophies. However,

most sanctuaries also share commonalities, which philosophers Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2015a: 50-51) from Queens University in Canada summarized by proposing six principles that they observed during their research at several existing sanctuaries. They termed the sanctuary model exemplified by these six principles the *refuge + advocacy* model, because it emphasizes the sanctuary as a safe haven for domestic animals and is committed to advocating an end to animal faming on their behalf (ibid.: 51). The two authors also propose an alternative model, which not only aims at offering a safe and permanent home, but additionally emphasizes the importance of letting sanctuary residents determine their own ways of living. This second model is called *intentional community* model, and again consists of six principles (ibid: 63-64). Since both models are analytic constructs, they function perfectly to analyze sanctuary practices with regard to the requirements of justice (ibid.: 51). In this thesis, I will therefore compare the two models and examine how well they are equipped when it comes to providing justice to domestic animals.

My sanctuary analysis does not only rest on the two models proposed by Donaldson and Kymlicka, however, but extends across three temporal dimensions: past, present, and future. I chose these dimensions, because I want to thoroughly analyze what FASes can do not only for their current residents, but also with regard to the historical injustice of domestication as well as a hypothetical future in which injustice in the form of animal agriculture has been abolished. Since farm animals have been subject to an unjust treatment since they were initially domesticated, it is important to address the past of existing residents as well as the anonymous victims of animal farming, and how the historical injustice of domestication, which applies to all of them, can be remedied. Also, to move towards justice, current practices need to be scrutinized with regard to current residents and we need to examine the stance that FASes take regarding a future free from animal farming and whether it conforms with the requirements of justice.

After explaining the two sanctuary models proposed by Donaldson and Kymlicka and their principles in more detail in Chapter 2, I will then examine them with regards to the three temporal dimensions. Accordingly, Chapter 3 is concerned with the past and examines how

both sanctuary models can make up for losses that residents experienced in their past. Additionally, this chapter will look at ways to symbolically compensate the anonymous animals that never made it to sanctuary and were instead killed by the agricultural system. The last section of Chapter 3 will then propose a way that not only compensates domestic animals, but aims at repairing the moral relations that we, as humans, have with farm animals. Chapter 4 is concerned with the present of resident animals and how sanctuaries can ensure their well-being. I will present the three most prevalent philosophical theories on well-being and argue as to why two of them should be rejected. Then I will defend my preferred theory, the objective list theory, and show how it can be applied to the case at hand to argue that farm animals are entitled to lives in which they can enjoy freedom, friendship, political participation, and meaning—values that I will also relate to justice. The next chapter is Chapter 5 and treats the dimension of the future. Here, I will examine the question of how we should live with farm animals in the future and discuss two scenarios. These scenarios are ‘extinctionism’, which aims to end our relations with domestic animals, and interspecies communities, which are directed at a continued co-existence. The last chapter will be a conclusion, which completes this thesis.

2 Farm Animal Sanctuaries: Two Models

In their paper entitled "Farmed Animal Sanctuaries: The Heart of the Movement? A Socio-Political Perspective" (2015a), Donaldson and Kymlicka (henceforth D&K) investigate FASes as sites where relations to domestic animals that are based on justice can be established and outline two different models of FASes. They distinguish the prevalent *refuge + advocacy* model, where the main goal is to rescue animals and give them a safe, lifelong home, from an *intentional community* model, which puts an emphasis on allowing resident animals to live their lives as freely and self-determinedly as possible. D&K stress that both models are analytic constructs that serve as "a framework for analyzing sanctuary practices" (ibid.: 51) and that elements of both models may be found in existing sanctuaries (ibid.). This section will give an introduction to these two models by illustrating how they "differ along a number of dimensions, including their underlying goals, decision-making procedures, the roles of humans and animals, and their relationship to the larger society" (ibid.: 68). These differences will also be highlighted throughout this thesis when investigating how both models can be utilized to provide justice to domestic animals in past, present, and future contexts. Furthermore, neither D&K's paper nor this thesis aim at critiquing the way that real life sanctuaries go about their routines. Rather, both analyses intend to explore FASes' possibilities for being and becoming sites of just interspecies living. Section 2.1 will therefore first clarify what is meant by a *refuge + advocacy* model, followed by section 2.2 where the *intentional community* model will be explained.

2.1 *Refuge + Advocacy* Model

According to D&K, sanctuaries that operate in compliance with the *refuge + advocacy* model adhere to six key principles that will be explained and illustrated with examples from real life sanctuaries in the following paragraphs. What these principles have in common is that under

standard animal agricultural practices,[3] they have been neglected and in sanctuary contexts now serve to allow for a more dignified existence. The explanations will therefore also entail a brief description of how these concepts are denied in for-profit animal agriculture.

The first principle is a *Duty of care,* which D&K explain as trying to achieve the following: "Provide a safe, healing environment for animals who have been abused by humans and the agriculture industry. Put the needs and safety of animal residents first" (ibid.: 51). Even though animals are of course also cared for in agricultural contexts to a certain extent, FASes strive to put as much effort and resources into the well-being of their residents as they are able to without them having to produce anything in return. This contrasts sanctuary practices with common agricultural practices, where animals are seen as means of production that can be disposed of when they cease to be profitable. Therefore, this basic principle is echoed in many descriptions of sanctuary goals, as is for example the case in this statement prominently put on the *Erdlingshof* homepage: "Erdlingshof helps earthlings who have fallen victim to livestock keeping practices and offers them a safe home" (Erdlingshof n.d.a, translated by Alina). Also Gene Baur, founder of *Farm Sanctuary*, highlights this principle by calling FASes "safe spaces" (2019: 101) and explaining that "[w]hen animals arrive at Farm Sanctuary, they are given food, shelter, and medical care, and they are allowed to live out their lives in peace" (ibid.: 99).

The second principle is the *Support for species-typical flourishing,* which aims to "[p]rovide an environment that allows animal residents to engage in a range of behaviors and activities

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[3] Standard animal agricultural practices are meant to be those predominantly performed in agriculture. I am well aware that agricultural practices differ between conventional and organic farms and also within these categories. Nevertheless, in 2017 about 93% of all area utilized for agriculture in the European Union was used for conventional agriculture (Eurostat 2020). When looking at livestock kept under organic conditions in the EU, there exist large differences between different animals, with organic pig herds representing less than 1% of all pigs, while organically kept sheep and goat herds contributed the highest percentage of any animal group with a share of about 6% (European Commission 2019: 4). Even though organic animal keeping practices as well as those operating under some kind of animal welfare label are considered to be more animal-friendly, we have to keep in mind that although these practices may make animals' lives less dreadful, they still do not allow most animals to live a good life and all of these animals are still commodities that are kept for the sole purpose of consuming their products and in the end their dead bodies.

considered natural for members of their species" (D&K 2015a: 51). Oftentimes, animals in agriculture are prevented from doing so, since they are kept in barren environments with little opportunity to fulfill these behaviors as there are, e.g., usually no wallows for pigs or bathing possibilities for ducks. A German FAS called *Land der Tiere* reverberates this and highlights the stark contrast with these standard practices when writing on their website about their pig residents and what they are able to do: "to roll in the dirt, rub on trees, lie in the sun, graze, craft, bathe, wallow. Just what pigs do when they can simply be pigs" (Land der Tiere n.d.a, translated by Alina).

Another principle is the *Recognition of individuality,* which calls us to "[a]ppreciate animals as unique personalities, with their own needs, desires, and relationships" (D&K 2015a: 51). Although in some countries certain animal species, as is the case with cattle in all EU member states, are required to be individually marked and in possession of formal documents listing e.g. their place and date of birth and their sex, similarly to a human passport, these regulations are mainly to monitor epizootic diseases and ensure food safety. Furthermore, just because these animals are individually recognizable by their earmark number does not entail any consequences for their treatment as subjects rather than commodities. When these animals arrive at a sanctuary, however, they are given a proper name,[4] by which the animal is no longer an object and is instead granted the subject status that she had formerly been denied. Accordingly, throughout this thesis we will hear about many different individuals, one marker of their individuality being their specific name. Baur continuously highlights the importance of seeing residents as their own unique beings and points out to the reader that "we need to remember that each is an individual, and each experiences his or her own life in a very real and personal way" (2019: 100). This also puts a focus on differentiating between animals not only by giving them a name but also by seeing their particular characters and desires, which is often accentuated by sanctuaries in their social media postings about residents.

[4] The term 'proper' is used in this case to indicate that the naming and thereby recognition of individuality is done to express respect for the animal.

The next principle is *Non-exploitation*. It is meant to "[c]hallenge conventional ideas of domesticated animals existing to serve human needs" and to "[e]schew use, sale, or other commercial activity involving animals" (D&K 2015a: 51). This principle is often expressed in sanctuary activities involving vegan advocacy like the attendance at vegan info events, information about veganism on their websites, or events at the sanctuaries themselves where a focus is put on spreading the word about abolishing animal keeping practices. *Hof Narr*, a FAS based in Switzerland, for example, puts an emphasis on serving delicious vegan food at their events (2019: 19 & 54) and also practices vegan organic agriculture at their sanctuary location (ibid.: 60). Additionally, this principle comes into play when FASes do not engage in training or working with the animals and is also reflected in the fact that any materials like eggs or wool that come from their residents are not eaten or otherwise used by humans. At *Luvin Arms Sanctuary*, residents' wool is instead given back to nature and can be used by wild animals to e.g. build nests (Griffler 2019: para. 3 & 5). Therefore, *Non-exploitation* lies at the core of what many sanctuaries try to convey to society as a new normal concerning domestic animals.

The fifth principle is *Non-perpetuation,* which aims to "[p]revent animals from breeding in order to subvert the future of animal farming" and "[d]edicate resources to rescuing animals already in existence" (D&K 2015a: 51-52). In animal agriculture, many female animals spend their existence as mere 'birthing machines' in order to produce the next generations of meat suppliers, like in the case of sows and mother cows, or to be actually able to produce the sought-after product themselves, as with dairy cows. These constant cycles of being impregnated, carrying offspring, giving birth, and then being impregnated soon after again, not only take a toll on these animals' bodies, but also keep the wheel of animal farming turning. Sanctuaries try to break this cycle by preventing their residents from producing offspring either by spaying or castrating them, keeping only same-sex groups together, or by preventing birds from incubating eggs. Additionally, sanctuaries do not want their residents to multiply by procreation because there are currently so many farm animals within exploitative

structures who would benefit from being rescued and living at a sanctuary that space and resources are reserved for those in need.

The last principle is *Awareness and advocacy,* where sanctuaries "[e]ducate the public about animal sentience, and the cruelties of animal farming" as well as "[f]oster respectful engagement with sanctuary residents as 'ambassadors' for the billions of animals suffering in the industrial agriculture system" (D&K 2015a: 52). *Hof Narr* calls this principle "the core of our vision of changing the world, which is supposed to reach as many hearts, move as many hands, and inspire as many heads as well as liberate as many humans and animals as possible" (2019: 18, translated by Alina). In order to follow this principle, many sanctuaries, including *Hof Narr* and the other FASes mentioned in this chapter, make it possible for people to visit their sanctuary and come into close contact with their residents, who serve as ambassadors that not only show people how the residents themselves want to live but also represent all their fellow species members who are suffering under standard animal agricultural practices. Thus, many FASes offer an array of activities, which may include guided sanctuary tours, educational programs aimed at children of different ages or the general public, summer celebrations, birthday parties, volunteering opportunities, and Christmas markets. Furthermore, social media, as well as print, audio, and visual communication platforms, also play a role in outreach for sanctuaries. Hence, many sanctuaries have *Facebook* profiles and *Instagram* accounts where they inform interested internet users about their residents, activities, and life at the sanctuary.

After introducing these principles and highlighting how sanctuaries put them into practice, we will now turn to see what sets the *intentional community* model apart from the *refuge + advocacy* model.

2.2 *Intentional Community* Model

The *intentional community* model, as described by D&K, strives to move away from seeing sanctuaries as 'total institutions', a term coined by sociologist Erving Goffman. He described total institutions as being "a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life" (Goffman 1961: xiii). Examples include refugee camps or nursing homes, where, as is the case with *refuge + advocacy* model FASes, there is a clear distinction between caregivers and those receiving care (D&K 2015a: 63). However, D&K (ibid.) note that even though the term 'sanctuary' seems to imply that they are some kind of temporary refuge, FASes are permanent homes to animal residents, more like nursing homes, which are permanent homes to the elderly, and less like refugee camps. For this reason, D&K consider that residents should be able to shape their environment and get a say in how they want to live their lives. Following the movement aspiring to transform residences for intellectually disabled humans in order to move away from the total institution model and give residents the possibility to shape their surroundings and live a more empowered life, D&K (ibid.) introduce six principles that have aided this shift in the human case and could also help in rethinking animal sanctuaries as intentional communities. In this section, I will enumerate these principles and give a short description along with explanations of how the *refuge + advocacy* model falls short of providing them as well as some examples of how these concepts could be or are already put into practice.

The first principle is *Belonging,* which gives all residents the status of equal community members (ibid.: 63-64). This status grants humans as well as nonhumans a foundation for full recognition of interests, desires, and idiosyncrasies. This principle mostly has implications for the enactment of the other principles, especially regarding paternalistic decision-making processes. If residents are not included in how their community is shaped, then residents cannot be said to be equal in status. Additionally, it is crucial that the community is not only composed of residents and humans who directly work for them but also other members who choose to live in this community for shorter or longer periods of time and add value in their

unique ways of contributing to the goal of exploring just interspecies living (ibid.: 68). An example of this could be the artist Hartmut Kiewert, who likes to spend some of his time at different FASes in Germany, where he paints the residents in order to raise awareness for animal rights issues and change peoples' views of the human-animal relationship (Hof Butenland 2019a; Hönisch 2018).

The second principle is the *Absence of fixed hierarchical relationships,* which establishes all members as both caregivers and recipients of care, especially with regard to the relationships between humans and nonhumans. It also means that residents have the opportunity to engage in relationships outside of care-related contexts (ibid.: 64). In *refuge + advocacy* FASes, it is quickly assumed that human caregivers know what is best for the animals or what seems to be best when trying to provide safety and care, but they might overlook the fluidity of relationships and the contexts in which all parties involved can benefit and learn from one another. Animal behavior research has shown, for instance, that many animals can provide care to conspecifics through, for example, consolation and helping behaviors (Monsó & Andrews forthcoming). Also mothers caring for their offspring would be a prominent example of care behavior, which is also displayed by farm animals if they are allowed to stay with their young. Therefore, it can be assumed that animals living at sanctuaries possess the ability to provide care and that they can extend this care also to members of other species, including humans, as will be further elaborated on in section 4.2.2 on Friendship. Hence, human sanctuary community members should make space for letting residents provide care to them while at the same time neither commercializing this care nor trying to obtain it by coercion.[5]

The next principle is *Self-determination,* which allows residents to shape their unique ways of living and their sources of contentment (ibid.: 64). In the *refuge + advocacy* model, the principle *Support for species-typical flourishing* largely determines the views regarding how an animal of a certain species wants to live. And while this can definitely serve as a first idea

[5] Respect and attention should be paid to the animals' body language and other ways that they might communicate assent or dissent. Also, one should be even more careful when animals have been trained to endure or initiate certain interactions that might seem like they are willfully providing care but is the result of conditioning.

as to what to provide these animals with, it should not form the entire and only perception of what kind of life this individual wants to lead (ibid.: 67). pattrice jones of *VINE Sanctuary* illustrates this when writing about some of their rooster residents, who have formerly been used for cockfighting: while some "choose a feral lifestyle, sleeping up in the trees and wandering the woods all day", "[o]thers move into the coops, joining former egg factory inmates and big 'broiler' chickens in a more sedate life" (2006: 1). Additionally, jones (ibid.: 2) explains that while some roosters like to spend time with the chickens or even care for chicks, others prefer to stay with other roosters or lead a solitary lifestyle.

Another principle is *Citizenship*, which grants a "'3P' model of rights: Protection, Provision, and Participation" (D&K 2015a: 64). While the first two (Protection and Provision) are also included in the *refuge + advocacy* model's principles, Participation allows residents to not only determine their ways of living but also gives them the power to mold the community. D&K describe several ideas concerning how to allow for Participation, one of which is practiced by *VINE Sanctuary*, where decisions are made in the presence of the animals that they are going to apply to, in order to have them serve as "a reminder, and a check, on human deliberation" (2015a: 67).

The fifth principle is *Dependent agency*. Agency can be defined to mean "self-willed or initiated action that carries an expectation of efficacy" (D&K 2015b: 180). Dependent agency therefore means agency that is "enacted through relationships with others" (D&K 2015a: 64), as residents might need help with conveying how they want to live or their choices regarding the enactment of their citizenship rights. In order to do this, it is crucial to be "expecting agency, looking for agency, and enabling agency" (D&K 2011: 110), instead of applying preconceived ideas of animal freedom and flourishing. In *Zoopolis*, D&K (ibid.: 108-112) describe several instances of (dependent) agency, especially concerning dogs but also farm animals. They highlight that when options are presented, animals do indeed express preferences but sometimes need the help of humans, who have the ability to provide, e.g., different types of food from which the animal can then choose, instead of assuming what the animal wants to eat (ibid.).

The last principle is called *Scaffolded choices and reconfigured spaces,* and adds emphasis to the conditions in which the former principles are set. This is achieved by careful introduction of new possibilities for living within the community, which represents the setting in which these choices can be made (D&K 2015a: 64). This also includes allowing animals to explore options like, for instance, types of work that might not be permissible under *refuge + advocacy* model conditions. One example for this could be letting pigs root in certain areas and subsequently using these plots as food producing gardens (ibid.: 62).

What also sets an *intentional community* model apart from a *refuge + advocacy* model is its way of engaging with larger society. While *refuge + advocacy* model sanctuaries usually try to achieve change by turning people vegan one by one and represent safe havens that are the only places where their principles are put into practice, D&K assert that "justice for domesticated animals ultimately requires that these principles be applied at a societal level, and not just within intentional communities" (2015a: 66). Therefore, the larger mission is not to abolish animal keeping and make FASes obsolete, but rather to serve as incubators of "small-scale experiments [for] new forms of interspecies community and justice" (ibid.) that can someday be applied to a broader societal context. This also has implications for how the resident animals are viewed and what role they play within these experiments: rather than being "ambassadors of an unjust present" (ibid.: 68), they could become "pioneers of a just future" (ibid.).

Having introduced the *refuge + advocacy* model as well as the *intentional community* model and illustrated their differences, the next chapters will examine how both models can serve to provide justice to residents currently living at the sanctuary as well as to those domesticated farm animals that never made it to sanctuary and also to those that have not been born yet. The following chapter, Chapter 3, will deal with how these two models can provide reparations for past injustices that apply to current residents but also to animals that have suffered under standard animal agricultural practices and were killed within their oppressive structures without ever having gotten the opportunity to be valued for who they were instead of what they produced.

3 Past

Even though any measures taken by sanctuaries to right injustices can only be applied in the present and will impact those animals that are currently living at sanctuaries (and hopefully also those with whom we will share the Earth in the future), this chapter is titled ‘Past’ because its focus is on the injustices that for residents of sanctuaries and also deceased victims happened in the past (despite these injustices still happening today). This chapter will address how the two sanctuary models can contribute to correcting these past injustices. Therefore, there are two groups of animals that will be addressed in this chapter: FAS residents and animals used in farming who did not get the chance to find refuge at a sanctuary and died within the agricultural system.

There are several measures that can be taken in order to remedy an injustice that happened in the past. This chapter will go into detail on two of them: (1) compensating the victims for the losses that they had to endure, since for some scholars, sanctuaries and their practices can in themselves already be seen as a remedy for the wrongfulness that many animals are and have been subject to (Marino, Bradshaw & Malamud 2009), and (2) moral repair, which strives for repairing the relationship between perpetrators and victims, as other philosophers call for additional practices aimed at restoring justice (Emmerman 2014). In section 3.1, we will first have a look at the notion of ‘rectificatory justice’, which includes compensation and restitution as measures to right past injustices. We will then establish which of the two is more appropriate when talking about animals living at sanctuaries. Subsequently, I will illustrate three losses that domestic animals used in farming frequently endure and how both sanctuary models can make up for these losses. At the end, I will also dive into the matter of symbolic compensation towards those animals that fell victim to the agricultural system and never made it to sanctuary. In section 3.2, I will explain Margaret Walker’s concept of moral repair and examine how sanctuaries can apply it in order to repair relationships with resident animals and also utilize it to create a future where humans will have ceased to exploit animals for financial gain. Within this section, I will additionally illustrate how farmers can take

responsibility for the part that they are playing in animal agriculture and explain why domestication is a matter of historical injustice that can be restored by moral repair.

3.1 Rectificatory Justice

In legal parlance, the term ‘rectificatory justice’ is used to describe those practices that are needed to make unjust matters right again (Roberts 2011: 936). According to O’Neill (1987: 74-75), it includes restitution, compensation, and punishment. Roberts (2011: 937) also adds apology as a separate item to its measures, while O’Neill (1987: 74) considers it a constituent of restitution. While restitution, compensation, and apology are centered around creating justice for the victim, punishment pertains to the wrongdoer. In this thesis, we will focus on restitution (including apology) and compensation, which are defined as follows. Restitution (or restoration)[6] “calls for the return of precisely that which has been lost as a result of injustice, as in the case of stolen property” (Roberts 2011: 937). An example of restoration would be the return of stolen aboriginal lands in Australia (O’Neill 1987: 74-75), but it also aims to mend the “ruptured moral relationship” (ibid.: 74) between offenders and victims, which entails that measures of restitution must be directly taken by those individuals that committed the injustice or their descendants or representatives and be directed at those that have been wronged or their descendants or representatives (ibid.). Therefore, restitution also includes apologies and forgiveness in order to restore a just state (ibid.). Compensation, on the other hand, “does not literally restore the particular things of which the victim has been deprived” (ibid.: 76). Hence, it can also be done by entities not directly involved in the unjust situation that calls for being set right (ibid.: 75) and is often done by presenting the victim with money or a substitute for something that has been taken away or stolen but that is not the original good (ibid.: 76). In the case of the Aborigines, for example, this could be land of similar size that is located somewhere else than the original land.

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[6] I will use the terms restitution and restoration interchangeably. For a detailed explanation of how the different terms are used and the fact that many are used interchangeably and sometimes inconsistently, see Daly & Proietti-Scifoni (2012).

From a purely legal perspective, neither restitution nor compensation can be applied to farm animals, because the practice of raising and killing animals for food is completely legal. When it comes to the moral dimension of this practice, however, advocates for animal rights, which also include many sanctuary founders and staff members, depart from the assumption that this practice is unjust. Therefore, there is the need to apply these concepts also to animals, especially to those who were wronged by being born into the exploitative system that is animal agriculture. It is questionable, however, whether these measures mean anything to the animals, insofar as they will most likely not be able to understand that they are being compensated for past injustices. Nevertheless, compensatory measures can have direct benefits to them if they attend to basic needs like food, shelter, medical care, or a stable social group (Mosquera 2016: 223). Additionally, even if restitutional or compensatory measures have no direct benefit to those that they are being applied to or, as with animals, might not be understood by them, when it comes to for example apologizing to infants or past generations, we nevertheless recognize these gestures as constructive acts of justice (Scotton 2017a: 307). Furthermore, measures of restitution, and also to a lesser extent of compensation, are not only taken to give back something that has been lost, but also appeal to the relationship between victim and offender and are therefore also important for the perpetrators, as they can practice remorse and acknowledge wrongdoing regardless of whether the victim has an understanding of these matters, as might also be the case with humans who have limited cognitive abilities due to different factors. Justice therefore requires to at least compensate animals, as it has a direct benefit to them, but also to figure out who the perpetrators are in order for them to acknowledge their role concerning injustice and consider how to move forward so that injustice can be terminated in the future.

Restitution or Compensation?

As I have explained, when looking at setting unjust matters right again for domestic animals, we can distinguish between restitution and compensation. To examine which of these concepts is applicable in sanctuary contexts, we have to determine, first, who the perpetrators are and, second, what has been lost. In the case of farm animals formerly used for production,

it can be hard to pinpoint who committed the injustice. One possibility would be the farmer(s) who raised a particular animal or used her. Responsibility, however, does not only lie with farmers but also with consumers who want to consume the products supplied by these animals. Additionally, there are several other stakeholders, like slaughterhouses that profit from killing the animals and further processing their bodies, companies that acquire financial gain by refining milk, eggs, and other animal-derived materials, and also supermarkets that sell the final products to the consumers. Thus, it is evident that there is some kind of shared responsibility when it comes to repairing injustice concerning domesticated farm animals.

The second issue is concerned with what has been taken away or what has been lost by the animal. For every animal this will differ and most likely have to be determined on an individual basis. One commonality shared by all domesticated animals, however, is their domestication status, which could be said to be a historical injustice and entails a loss of self-sufficiency and wildness.[7] Other examples of losses may include: freedom, appropriate social contact, offspring, (reproductive) autonomy, bodily integrity, well-being, health, dignity, and so on. Since restitution relies on restoring the exact thing that has been lost, in many cases this will simply not be possible, because, e.g., genetically-derived health problems or severed body parts cannot be cured or regained. Also, it will very rarely be possible to reunite a mother with her lost children or let residents take complete control of their reproductive autonomy. Therefore, even though we can assume "shared duties of compensation" (Mosquera 2016: 234) that allow for virtually everybody[8] to engage in acts of restitution, when it comes to restoring what has been lost, matters become more complicated. Thus, we will rather speak of compensating the animals, to ensure that sanctuary work, even though in some cases being of restitutional character, falls inside the correct terminology, since when speaking of compensation the identification of perpetrators is secondary as are the exact measures that are taken to compensate the victims.

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[7] We will bracket the topic of domestication in this section and come back to it in section 3.2 on Moral Repair.

[8] This is the case because most humans are profiting or have profited at some point in their lives off of domestic animals in some way. This most likely also includes sanctuary founders, members, and staff.

Losses and Compensation

Even though restitution might be possible in some cases, depending on definitions of who the perpetrator was and what has been lost, with sanctuaries it makes the most sense to speak of compensating the residents rather than making restitution. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to compensate animals in ways that they understand and which should therefore be as close as possible to restitution, since common means of compensation, like money, do not function with regard to animals. This section will illustrate how residents could be compensated by explaining possible losses and introducing real life examples of animals living at different sanctuaries who have suffered these losses while also analyzing how the *refuge + advocacy* model and the *intentional community* model might differ regarding possible ways of compensation.

The first loss that I want to highlight has to do with bodily integrity and health. In animal agriculture, it is common practice to mutilate animals, with specific interferences for different groups of animals. The most common ones include but are not limited to: disbudding or dehorning dairy cows, beak trimming of laying hens and turkeys, tail-docking pigs as well as routinely castrating boars.[9] Another way of tempering with animals' health is by selectively breeding them in order to maximize their productivity, be it to give as much milk or to lay as many eggs as possible, or to put on as much muscle mass in the right places as fast as possible. Almost all animals used in agriculture are either subject to mutilations or harmful genetic makeups or to husbandry practices that sooner or later lead to often severe health problems and usually result in them being slaughtered prematurely. As already mentioned, it is oftentimes not possible to completely restore these animals' health or to give back body parts. What sanctuaries can do, however, is to induce pertinent veterinary treatment and either take measures that bar the animal's body from further producing e.g. milk, or supply appropriate measures of care that can (partly) make up for health problems caused by high productivity and unsuitable environments.

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[9] All of these practices are legal under current animal welfare legislation in many EU member states with slight differences depending on the country in question.

An example of how sanctuaries can compensate animals for harmful treatment in the past is provided by Tilda and Karlsson's story. Tilda is a former dairy cow, who arrived at FAS *Hof Butenland* with abomasal displacement after having given birth to her son Karlsson, who suffered from omphalitis, an infection of the umbilical stump. Despite already being destined to go to the slaughterhouse because of these complications, they both found a home at *Hof Butenland*, where Tilda's abomasum issues as well as Karlsson's navel were treated by a veterinarian, resulting in quick recovery of mother and son (Hof Butenland n.d.a). At the same time, Karlsson was not only able to keep his life, but also allowed to grow and keep his horns, and Tilda's body was not strained by further births and having to supply milk almost all year around. Hence, when it comes to bodily integrity and health, both sanctuary models are equally equipped to compensate animals by ensuring appropriate veterinary care, allowing for recovery, and providing an environment that aids in restoring and maintaining health. Presumably, however, Karlsson will be castrated in order not to impregnate the cows that he will be living with. As mentioned, this practice is part of the *Non-perpetuation* principle of *refuge* + *advocacy* FASes and may be warranted by considerations of space and resource limitations. On the other hand, taking away bodily integrity by castrating animals might present a continuation of injustice. We will have a closer look at this issue in Chapter 5.

Another loss that specifically female animals frequently endure is the loss of their offspring. In dairy farming, calves are usually taken away from their mothers within the first twenty-four hours after they are born, despite their innate drive to form tight bonds and suckle for about ten months, with females staying with their matrilineal herds for a lifetime and males leaving when they are old enough to form bachelor groups.[10] In pig farming, sows get to care for their piglets for the duration of three to six weeks, whereas natural weaning would occur between fourteen and seventeen weeks of age (Jensen 1986: 139) and mother-piglet groups would stay together beyond this time. Usually, when a female who has given birth to often several calves or litters of piglets is rescued, it will not be possible to find her children and reunite them with

[10] For a detailed overview of cattles' natural social lives, see Bouissou, Boissy, Le Neindre, & Veissier (2001).

her, since they will have most likely already been slaughtered. The endeavor would also be pointless if there had been no possibility for bond-formation between them.

There are several other ways of how these females can be compensated without bringing back their own offspring, however, two of which I want to talk about in this paragraph. The first way applies to those animals that arrive at the sanctuary pregnant or together with their baby, as in the case of Tilda and Karlsson. Allowing these females to raise their offspring and form long-lasting bonds can be seen as compensating them by providing them with the possibility to not only be a mother but to engage in related behaviors. This would be possible for both *refuge + advocacy* FASes as well as *intentional community* sanctuaries. A practice in line with the *Non-Perpetuation* principle of the *refuge + advocacy* model, however, is the abortion of offspring if a pregnancy in incoming residents is detected in the early stages (Griffler 2020: para. 7). Despite obvious and formerly mentioned reasons for engaging in this practice, it does not serve to compensate these animals and, if not essential to ensure the mother's survival, would additionally present an act of injustice. Indeed, we do not know whether this animal wants to be pregnant but intervening in this highly paternalistic manner would not be compatible with the *intentional community* model's principles, as it puts the merely technical concerns of the sanctuary first and thereby enforces existing hierarchies. The second way of compensating the loss of offspring is by letting interested animals care for younger rescues by showing them the ropes or serving as aunts for offspring of other residents. An example includes ox Mattis, who was born at *Hof Butenland* and chose cow Gisela to be his grandma of choice, who herself had lost fourteen children to the dairy industry (Hof Butenland n.d.b; Hof Butenland 2015). Compensating residents in this way would be available to both models but the example also shows how compensation can sometimes only start to account for injustices committed against these animals.

The last loss that I would like to stress is the loss of freedom and autonomy. In animal agriculture, this loss is present in almost every aspect of animals' lives, from being born on schedule to the way they are kept until the planned day of their death. Since Chapter 4.2.1 is going to focus on Freedom, this section will concentrate on the aspect of confinement as one

way of losing freedom. Many animal husbandry systems rely on confining animals in order to save space and thereby maximize production outputs and to make it easier for farmers to monitor animals. One of these systems are tie-stalls for dairy cows, traditionally used by small-scale farmers. Here, cows are chained by their necks, merely able to take one step forward or back and barred from engaging in appropriate social contact and different comfort behaviors. Also, even though some EU member states have phased out cage systems for laying hens, many others continue the practice where chickens have about the space equal to one page of DIN-A4 paper to move around, not even mentioning the lack of sun, fresh air, or possibilities for dust bathing and other natural behaviors. Other practices ostensibly serve animal welfare purposes, like the crating of mother sows, which keeps the sow from squishing her piglets when lying down. This practice, even though widely accepted and defended by farmers, is currently eliciting public outrage and, as shown by animal welfare scientists, would not be necessary in the first place if the sow was given more space and environmental stimuli, such as straw, which have positive effects on maternal behavior and benefit piglet survival (Herskin, Jensen & Thodberg 1998: 252).

Providing space to move around and possibilities to fulfill behaviors like exploration, comfort, and play is represented in the *refuge + advocacy models'* principle of *Support for species-typical flourishing.* Coming to a sanctuary is therefore the first step to losing the shackles of exploitative captivity and stepping into the freedom of mobility for many animals that had formerly been confined. Bird residents at *VINE Sanctuary*, for example, are provided with "as much space as possible […]; […] the basic essentials for living a meaningful life […]; and we leave them alone unless and until they make it clear they want some attention from us" (Jones 2014: 95). As Miriam Jones (2014: 94), co-founder of *VINE Sanctuary*, also explains, however, for some animals captivity not only comes in the form of physical confinement, but also has lasting impacts on their psyche, which results in them not actually using the space they are given because they are too afraid of their newfound freedom. Here, the *intentional community* model's principle of *Scaffolded choices and reconfigured spaces* could serve to aid those afraid of freedom by designing appropriate spaces that can alleviate

their fear and by providing tailored choices that do not overwhelm a new resident. Thus, while both models can compensate formerly confined animals by providing space and the freedom to move around, which subsequently allows also for the enactment of different behaviors, the *intentional community* model can additionally compensate animals by designing space and choice in ways that contribute to residents' use of their novel freedoms.

After looking at possible losses and how sanctuaries can compensate for these, we will now turn to examine how sanctuaries can compensate animals that have never made it there, but were instead killed within the oppressive structures of animal agriculture.

Symbolic Compensation

When talking about (symbolic) compensation for past victims of historical injustices in humans, it is usually assumed that the unjust acts are indeed historical and have therefore been terminated. Parties who can thus be compensated are either surviving victims (which are similar to residents living at sanctuaries), descendants of these victims who may now be worse off due to said injustices, or already dead victims. Since the previous section illustrated how surviving victims and their descendants can be compensated, this section will have a look at how sanctuaries can symbolically compensate already dead victims. An important note at this point is that, in the case of domestic animals, the injustices that are posed by the raising and killing of animals for the production of food and other commodities are ongoing and not solely historical. Nevertheless, there is arguably a duty to symbolically compensate also dead victims, even though the acknowledging of (past) injustice cannot be directly done towards the deceased, but only towards animals and humans who are alive (Meyer 2006: 415). According to Meyer (ibid.), this obligation simply arises from the fact that also dead victims were indeed victims of injustice and just as we owe survivors and their descendants compensation, we owe it to the defunct.

Means of symbolic compensation are, for example, memorials, which "may be a public speech, a day in the official calendar, a conference, a public space or a monument—for example, a sculpture or an installation" (ibid.: 416). D&K (2011: 196) also suggest education

and collective apologies. And Scotton speaks of an "'animal rights landscape' incorporating museums, monuments, public art, festivals, and other forms of convivial attention to the historical experiences of nonhuman animals" (2017a: 320). When it comes to sanctuaries, they usually commemorate their residents when they die (jones & Gruen 2016), for example in the form of a *Facebook* or blog post with a poem and some information about this animal's story and how their death came about (see e.g. Hof Butenland 2020). Anonymous victims are sometimes addressed in public speeches within advocacy and educational efforts, but there are few memorials at sanctuaries or other forms of compensation explicitly directed at the unknown animal victims of oppression that I know of. One exception is the "Animal Activism Art Collection" exhibited at FAS *Land der Tiere* in Germany, where a variety of artwork created by different artists regarding the human-animal relationship and also portraying several anonymous farm animal victims can be viewed (Land der Tiere n.d.b). Nonetheless, memorials usually belong to those animals who were named and cherished, be it as pets or as residents of FASes. These commemorations could be seen as also applying to these unknown victims, since residents of *refuge + advocacy* sanctuaries are seen as ambassadors and therefore to a certain extent represent the unknown victims of injustice. However, there is no direct mention of 'the others' and, thus, these tributes do not serve as means of compensation directly aimed at animals who died within the system, never escaping exploitation.

One artist who is doing the work of remembering these animals is Linda Brant, who writes:

> "The animals that interest me are the ones that are the most useful
> The most used and the least remembered
> The most needed and the least cherished
> Anonymous victims." (2017: 101)

She describes how she collects farm animal bones from farms and other places where animals are slaughtered and subsequently cleans, prepares, and photographs them to acknowledge her guilt and her role in a society that exploits and victimizes animals, while asking questions like "Is it possible to mourn the lives of unknown animals?" or "What effects might honest

confrontation with guilt and anonymity (human and nonhuman) have on interspecies relationships?" (ibid.: 106). This artistic commemoration of anonymous farm animals can be seen as a possible way of symbolically compensating them, especially since it also has an effect on the human who is doing the work and thereby not only questions her role in but also expresses her attitude towards the topic at hand (Meyer 2016: 417).

Even though FASes currently only compensate and remember their residents and do very little to symbolically compensate animals that have died as the result of and within agricultural practices, they are theoretically equipped to do so. Possible ways could be to designate a space at the sanctuary to unknown victims or to erect a monument or sculpture that serves to commemorate them. Since many sanctuaries also allow frequent visitation, these memorials could be included in guided tours or educational programs and thereby normalize the mourning and remembering of anonymous farm animals. This idea could be applied in both sanctuary models and is line with the *refuge + advocacy* model's principle of *Awareness and advocacy* and also complies with the *intentional community* model's idea to create "a space within which to explore a better world" (D&K 2015a: 65). Additionally, these practices could have the effect of "providing surviving victims or groups with assistance in recovering or regaining membership and recognition in their respective societies, such that they are once again able to lead lives under conditions of justice" (Meyer 2020: 5.4). Therefore, the mourning and remembering of all animals that were victims of injustice related to an agricultural context could serve to not only compensate them, but also to contribute to just future relations with domestic animals.

After examining the topic of compensation for past injustices regarding sanctuary residents and other victims of agricultural practices, we will now look at the concept of moral repair, which goes beyond compensation.

3.2 Moral Repair

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, sanctuaries themselves may be seen as a remedy to the (historical) injustices endured by farm animals, since they provide formerly exploited animals with compensatory measures like ample space, adequate food, companionship, and medical attention (Marino et al. 2009: 27). However, Emmerman claims that we should not see sanctuaries "as the last stop in the moral work needed to counter the harm humans cause animals" (2014: 215), as merely compensating them could lead to a feeling of satisfaction that the injustice has now been righted or even erased and we can move on without further ado (Almassi unpublished ms: 5). Additionally, Almassi states that "moral responses to human-caused animal suffering such as animal sanctuaries fall short if assessed in terms of their ability to 'make whole' the non-human victims of such inter-species conflicts" (ibid.: 6), also implying that simply transferring some animals to sanctuaries and providing them with some of the things that had previously been lacking from their lives or were taken from them is not enough to right the injustice done. And also Walker warns that "compensation may be given out of charity or generosity, rather than as fulfillment of what justice requires" (2010: 17). Therefore, we need to examine a concept that goes beyond the scope of mere compensatory measures when dealing with injustices.

The concept that I want to discuss in this section is called moral repair and was formulated by philosopher Margaret Urban Walker. Moral repair is a victim-centered approach, aimed at making things right again for the ones who have been confronted with injustice (Walker 2006a: 6-7). Walker highlights that "if moral repair means anything it means the attempt to address offense, harm, and anguish to those who suffer wrong" (ibid.). Furthermore, she refers to moral repair as "the task of restoring or stabilizing - and in some cases creating - the basic elements that sustain human beings in a recognizably moral relationship" (ibid.: 23). With this aim in mind, moral repair encompasses six tasks: 1) identifying offenders and endowing them with responsibility, 2) acknowledging the harm that has been done, 3) (re)installing common moral standards by means of authority, 4) + 5) cultivating trust within and among people as well as sustaining hope that these standards are respected and followed by everyone, and 6)

connecting victims and perpetrators by establishing appropriate moral relationships between them (ibid.: 28). Hence, even though compensation may be in order, the focus lies on repairing the relationship between the parties that were involved in the encroachment (Walker 2006b: 384-385) and restoring the trust that moral standards are shared and followed by everybody (2006a: 28). Thus, there needs to be actual remorse on the perpetrators' side and a willingness to justly reintegrate the victims into society. While Walker's approach is meant to apply to inter-human injustices, authors like Scotton (2017a), Almassi (unpublished ms), and Emmerman (2012, 2014) also apply it to interspecies conflicts, even though it does not "'map perfectly' to the inter animal realm" (Emmerman 2014: 226), because it is at least unclear whether animals understand our intentions and share our moral standards (ibid.). Nevertheless, Walker grants that while "our senses of value and responsibility can be dulled, eroded, disconnected […] they can also be confirmed and revived, even extended to people or situations to which we have not applied them before" (2001: 113). I see the interspecies conflict between humans and farm animals as a kind of situation calling for reviving those senses of value and responsibility and therefore warranting the application of the notion of moral repair.

Farmers and Responsibility

Since moral repair aims at restoring relationships, similarly to some of the aims of restitution discussed earlier, in moral repair there is also the issue of identifying perpetrators and holding them accountable for their actions. However, as already explained in one of the previous paragraphs, with farm animals it is usually quite problematic to exactly determine who is or was committing a wrong, since the entire system of animal agriculture is based on a refusal of responsibility by all parties involved such that there is never a single culprit: farmers and supermarkets just cater to consumer demands and consumers do not engage in raising and killing animals but simply buy products at the supermarket. Hence, there is no-one to blame. Despite this dispute, I would like to again assert that we as a society have a shared responsibility concerning the exploitation of animals and the use of their bodies, since we are all actively taking part in or at least benefitting from it.

There is also a special case, however, where moral repair can be directly engaged in by those who are responsible for bringing animals into the world, who raise and work with them. Even though it is still somewhat rare, a growing number of farmers decides to terminate animal farming practices and to give their remaining animals the chance to live the rest of their lives free from having to serve a purpose. Examples include the beginnings of FAS *Hof Butenland*, where former dairy farmer Jan Gerdes did not want his last ten cows to go to slaughter and instead created a lifelong home for them and subsequently also other farm animal residents (Hof Butenland n.d.c). Also Toni Kathriner and his wife Yvonne had grown weary of having to separate calves and cows in order to supply dairy, and first switched to beef production, where mothers and babies can stay together for a longer period of time, before deciding to turn their backs on animal agriculture altogether and to found a sanctuary instead (Kathriner 2019). Since farmers are the ones who engage in daily direct contact with living animals from when they are born and oftentimes until they are sent to slaughter, farmers who found sanctuaries have a unique opportunity to bridge the divide that had put them above their animals and eventually heal the ruptured moral relationship between them.

Even though animals might not right away understand their changed circumstances, the founding of a sanctuary creates a field of opportunity for building, renewing, and maintaining trust so that justice can begin to prosper. Moreover, when deciding to end animal farming, many farmers voice a discomfort concerning their practices related to animals that had oftentimes accompanied them for a long time (Hof Narr 2019: 14-15, 44-45, 61). Thus, the switch from farming animals to seeing and honoring their personalities and their lives has a profound significance not only for these animals but also for the farmer. One anonymous farmer states: “Every time I looked the pigs into the eyes, I saw their desire to trust. Up to the point that I would have rather killed myself than these innocent creatures” (Hof Narr 2019: 61, translated by Alina). By establishing a space where trust and hope can be restored and where relationships can heal, farmers are sowing the seeds for a society where norms no longer “define unequal statuses on bogus forms of innate superiority” (Walker 2006b: 381) and justice can be served.

Domestication

An issue of historical injustice applying to all domestic animals is their domestication status. Domestication includes two parts: the alteration of an animal's physical features to comply with human (production) goals as well as the loss of the ability to be self-sufficient, resulting in a dependency on humans for basic needs (Swart & Keulartz 2011: 188). Since the time when this transformation from wild to domesticated was induced by ancient humans, these animals have been used to supply a variety of materials as well as services. For domestication to be a matter of historical injustice, however, it is required that the victims be worse off today than they would have been had the injustice not occurred, which in turn grants that applying restorative measures is appropriate (Meyer 2006: 407). It could be argued that animals in the wild are generally not much better off in terms of for example life expectancy or health status than animals used in some farming practices. However, extreme bodily alterations resulting from centuries of selective breeding with lasting impacts on an animal's well-being have no parallel in nature, and amount to a human-caused injustice. Examples include broiler chickens, who, even when residing at a sanctuary, rarely live longer than one to two years until their bodies cease to function, or dairy cows who are bred to supply so much milk that they regularly endure a negative energy balance postpartum, meaning that body reserves are mobilized and channeled into milk production after a cow has given birth, which leaves her emaciated for several weeks, weakens her immune response, and can subsequently lead to various health problems that in many cases seal her death sentence (Bekuma & Galmessa 2019). Additionally, the domestication of animals has given rise to the idea that humans are distinctly different from animals (Ferrari 2019: 354) and thus created the base for feelings of superiority over the entire animal kingdom. The exploitative system of animal agriculture is therefore also based on this initial divide caused by domestication. Hence, domestication can be seen as a historical injustice of which every domesticated animal suffers the consequences and makes many of them presumably worse off than they would have been if this divide had never happened. Other than compensation, however, which would—with regard to domestication—be like putting a patch over a broken limb instead of using a cast, moral

repair can be a more adequate way to account for this injustice, by countering this divide and restoring more appropriate relations with domesticated animals.

Let us now turn to see how the two sanctuary models can apply the concept of moral repair to address domestication and the other kinds of injustices done to farm animals.

Sanctuary Efforts

Even though this chapter is concerned with injustices that, for residents as well as anonymous animals that were slaughtered at the end of their productive lifespan, happened in the past, moral repair tries to address and account for these injustices in the present and also entails a commitment to future-directed justice (Walker 2010: 25-26). As Emmerman writes:

> "[m]oral repair involves more than calculating a just compensation for harms done. It attends to the relationships between the parties; it involves noticing how the relationships are impacted by systems beyond the individuals and thus enables us to focus on features of those systems that need improvement" (2014: 226).

Therefore, sanctuaries provide a unique opportunity for humans to not only repair relationships with their residents on an individual level but also to commit themselves to repairing a broken system of animal exploitation and attend to interspecies relationships on a societal level. When assessing sanctuaries in terms of how they can account for the "reparation of the moral conditions for healthy inter-species relationships" (Almassi unpublished ms: 6), Almassi suggests to ask the following questions: "Are their practices meaningfully victim-centered, for example, or driven by visitors' and caretakers' own interests?" or "Do these practices evidence meaningful attempts at moral accountability?" (ibid.).

At *refuge + advocacy* FASes, the principle of *Recognition of individuality* can be seen as a starting point for engaging in moral repair on an individual level, as it implies recognizing the uniqueness of residents and allows for the development of a relationship with a particular animal. On the other hand, since *refuge + advocacy* model sanctuaries see their residents as

ambassadors who serve to convince visitors to adopt a vegan lifestyle, there needs to be a careful assessment of how much of their lives and relationships are actually meant to be for them and not for well-meant human interests. Also, since moral repair involves both perpetrators and victims and focuses on their relationship, it is important for caretakers to not only create trusting relationships with residents, but to also evaluate their own role in practices concerning the exploitation of animals and become aware of their motives for engaging in sanctuary work. Nevertheless, *refuge + advocacy* FASes' care practices and their attempts at advocating for the end of animal farming as well as their educational efforts on and off sanctuary grounds can be seen as vital in repairing relationships to residents on an individual level as well as making visible our broken agricultural systems to a broader public.

At *intentional community* model sanctuaries, practices of moral repair can be undertaken on a more profound level, however, because their principles of *Belonging* and the *Absence of fixed hierarchical relationships* allow humans and animals to come together at eye level, which makes for an even better starting point when trying to repair broken relationships and establish trust. Additionally, an *intentional community* sanctuary tries to model what a just interspecies society could look like, rather than trying to turn people vegan one by one, and even though these projects are only small sites of exploration, they hold the potential to become a blueprint for larger endeavors. According to Walker, "[r]estorative justice encourages 'bottom-up' efforts of justice" (2006b: 386), meaning that not only individual perpetrators need to do the work but that communities "can also serve as actors or as guarantors of repair and restoration of relationships" (ibid.). Here, any number of motivated humans can come together with formerly exploited animals and create as well as share a place that not only provides a refuge where current agricultural practices are questioned but also serves as a space where humans can actively practice remorse, apologize, and rebuild trust within themselves and with other human and nonhuman community members.

Thus, all sanctuaries can in principle be sites of moral repair but should be cautious of how they engage in this work, what motives lie behind their efforts, and their own role within a society where injustice towards animals is not only historical but also ongoing. In the end,

however, there is the need to not only end animal exploitation but to come together on a societal level and engage in the work of moral repair to acknowledge that we have done wrong and start to restructure our relationships with domesticated animals.

4 Present

When striving for justice with regard to farm animals in the present, sanctuaries should ensure that they are treating their residents justly by promoting their well-being. When I talk about well-being I mean the concept of which "[n]ear-synonyms […] include those of welfare, eudaimonia, individual good, and flourishing"[11] (Moore 2017: 328). Even though animal welfare is a concept that is prevailing in farm animal discourse, sanctuaries differ from most agricultural farms in that they secure their residents' basic right to life as the foundation on which everything that contributes to well-being can then be based. Therefore, at sanctuaries well-being does not serve as a kind of instrumental value, as it often does on farms, where promoting animal welfare can have positive consequences not only for the animals but also for the profitability of the farm. For example, farmers can profit from increased animal welfare, as it reduces animal mortality and thereby increases production efficiency and also decreases veterinary cost compared to animals who are less healthy due to enjoying less welfare (Dawkins 2017: 203). Additionally, farmers can benefit by receiving premiums for their products because consumers might be willing to pay more if the product is labeled as 'welfare-friendly' (ibid.: 204). Since sanctuaries do not need their animals to be profitable, well-being is not seen here as an instrumental value but rather as a matter that is required by justice. The exact requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for someone, human or otherwise, to experience well-being, however, will depend on the theory that is being used.

In philosophy, there are three distinguished theories of well-being: 1) hedonism, which is a pleasure-based account, 2) desire-fulfillment theory, and 3) objective list theories. In section 4.1 I will describe the first two and explain why I will not use them when talking about animals living at sanctuaries. The following section 4.2 will then go into detail on the objective list theory, why I believe it to be better suited for my endeavor, and why I selected the four values that will then be discussed in the subsequent sections. These values are: freedom, friendship, political participation, and meaning. Each value will be defined and I

[11] These terms will be used interchangeably to refer to the concept of well-being.

will illustrate why it is an objective value as well as how it contributes to well-being and how it pertains to animals.

4.1 Hedonism and Desire-Fulfillment Theory

As mentioned, there are three main theories in philosophy that are concerned with well-being. In general, these theories aim to establish "what things are in themselves in our interest to have" (Heathwood 2014: 200) or what contributes to someone's life going well for them. This section will illustrate two of these theories. The first account is called 'hedonism' and focusses solely on pleasure and pain. This means that well-being to a hedonist simply means achieving "[t]he greatest balance of pleasure over pain" (Crisp 2017: 4.1), or put more simply, for an individual to indulge in as many things or actions that lead to the feeling of pleasure, be it reading a great novel, swimming in the ocean, or hugging a friend. Even though achieving pleasure can be a worthwhile goal, an objection to hedonism is that it is constituted of "too few prudential goods" (Fletcher 2016: 153), meaning that pleasure is not the only thing that brings well-being to someone or lets her flourish. Additionally, my life can go well for me even if I do not experience pleasure all the time and also living through hardship might contribute to a better life in the future.

Also animals can enjoy pleasurable experiences, but their welfare is neither entirely dependent on it nor merely made up of it. When looking at what 'animal welfare' means among scientists in this field, they list 'affective states', referring to pleasurable and painful emotional states, but also emphasize that there are at least two other goods that contribute to animal welfare, like health and being able to live out natural behaviors in more or less natural environments (Fraser 2008). Moreover, there have been suggestions to improve animal welfare by 'disenhancing' animals so that they, for example, are not able to feel pain anymore (Shriver & McConnachie 2018: 164). A pleasure-based account would claim that these disenhancements would increase welfare, because if there is no pain, then the balance of pleasure over pain will be shifted in favor of the former. However, besides pain being an

important sensory input that aids in avoiding injury (ibid.), it seems rather absurd to increase welfare by taking away bodily capacities instead of trying to improve, e.g., husbandry systems. Therefore, I reject a purely hedonistic theory when trying to figure out how to achieve justice through well-being for animal sanctuary residents.

The second theory is commonly called ‘desire-fulfillment theory’ and establishes that what is good for someone is whatever she desires. Therefore, there are as many prudential goods as there are desires (Fletcher 2016: 153), for example taking a cold shower on a hot summer day or smoking a cigarette. The latter example already hints at one objection to this theory: desires do not necessarily contribute to overall well-being, as smoking is commonly known to be linked to the development or worsening of different diseases. Therefore, even if someone is aware that their desire is actually bad for them, this theory holds that its fulfillment nevertheless leads to well-being. Moreover, it could be the case that “desires are formed in light of bad information, oppressive living conditions, or limited thought for the future” (Rice 2016: 380). Hence, factors responsible for a desire might entail that I desire something that is actually harmful and that I would perhaps not desire if the circumstances were different. According to this theory, however, these desires would nonetheless support flourishing. Additionally, there might be things that benefit me even if I do not desire them, like exercising five times a week or eating broccoli, which would nevertheless not add to well-being according to desire theory.

When it comes to animals, it is easy to see how some of their desires are also actually harmful to them. For example, my dog might desire to eat the entire bag of dog food, but doing so would most likely result in him feeling very ill. This does not mean, of course, that all of his desires are harmful and many might actually result in his life going well for him. Nonetheless, a desire-based account neither exclusively comprises affairs that lead to someone’s well-being nor does it include all matters that do. With regard to domesticated animals, we also have to keep in mind that their desires have been altered by selective breeding to make them, for example, more docile and therefore better suited to work with and use. Moreover, we could, similarly to the disenhancement of animals mentioned above, imagine a scenario where

animals are engineered to actually want to be used and also killed and eaten, as is the case with Priscilla the pig in a famous novel by Douglas Adams (Baggini 2006: 13). Despite these disenhancements being ethically questionable and as of right now also rather impractical, this example also illustrates the absurdities to which following a desire-fulfillment theory could lead with regard to domestic animals.

Since I reject both of these accounts, in the following section we need to take a closer look at the third theory concerned with well-being.

4.2 Objective List Theory

An objective list theory gives a list of goods that contribute to someone's well-being independently of her attitude towards these goods (Fletcher 2016: 151). These theories are usually pluralistic,[12] meaning that there is more than one good on the list, but they also do not comprise as many as a desire theory (ibid.). The goods are usually those things that people would name if asked "what they ultimately want for themselves and their loved ones" (ibid.: 152). These are, for example, health, loving relationships, knowledge, autonomy, pleasure, achievement, and so forth (ibid.; Rice 2013: 197). Even though many people might desire these goods, however, this theory holds that they add to well-being regardless of whether someone desires, cares about, or is interested in them.

Regarding animals and their well-being, scientists usually take the species-norm, behaviors that are typical for animals and the environments they usually live in, and use it to construct definitions of welfare, as mentioned above, that are meant to explain what is objectively good for an animal of a certain species. This conception, however, seems rather narrow, as animals can also achieve well-being through behaviors that are not species-typical (Rice unpublished ms: 6). Additionally, accounts of human well-being do not focus on certain characteristic behaviors or ways of living (ibid.: 8), presumably because we acknowledge that humans are

[12] Hedonism could be seen as a monistic objective list theory (Fletcher 2016: 151).

individuals with very different preferences, characters, and possibilities. If we recognized that animals are also individuals who are not solely defined by their species, we could move towards an approach that sees the similarities between animals and humans while at the same time granting space for their differences.

One of these approaches was formulated by Martha Nussbaum, who created a list with goods benefitting human as well as animal well-being. These goods are: 1) life, 2) bodily health, 3) bodily integrity, 4) senses, imagination, and thought, 5) emotions, 6) practical reason, 7) affiliation, 8) relation to other species, 9) play, and 10) control over one's environment (Nussbaum 2007: 393-400). Even though she applies slightly different definitions of these capabilities in the case of animals compared to humans, she leaves room within these categories for members of a species to exercise them according to their circumstances. For example, a dog who is unable to use his hind legs may be aided by means of a special wheelchair so that he can fulfill his capability of running around (ibid.: 365). Therefore, "the species norm (duly evaluated) tells us what the appropriate benchmark is for judging whether a given creature has decent opportunities for flourishing" (ibid.), and thus what is required by justice. Still, this theory leaves little room for achieving well-being through means that might not be included in the repertoire of a species' capabilities (Rice unpublished ms: 10). Even though I will not take Nussbaum's list to inquire on how sanctuaries can provide well-being to their residents, some of the values that I will discuss in the next sections are inspired by her list of capabilities.

Also Christopher Rice served as an inspiration when formulating my list. He takes a slightly different approach by recommending to construct an objective list theory that holds

> "that a number of basic objective goods benefit animals whenever they are realized in their lives. These goods apply to all animals, whatever their characteristic behavior or forms of capability. In addition, these goods are objective, in that they benefit animals independently of their desires and other subjective attitudes toward them" (unpublished ms: 11).

Although he does not present a list with specific values, he suggests that “an objective list theory would need to include goods related to thought, emotion, freedom, activity, and certain other domains” (ibid.), which is also reflected in my deliberations about a list of items that could contribute to the well-being of animals living at sanctuaries.

The goods that I chose are: freedom, friendship, political participation, and meaning. At first, these values might seem rather arbitrary, which could be an objection to such an approach, but what they have in common is that all of them were withheld from residents before they came to a sanctuary. Other than Rice, I do not claim that these items universally apply to all animals, since my focus lies on domesticated farm animals, although it could be argued that they are objectively good for any animal. Also, I do not consider that this list is complete and that only these goods contribute to the well-being of animals. Nevertheless, an objection to my approach could be that it insufficiently involves the individual (animal) in that the goods on my list do not necessarily bring well-being to her specifically, because they are objective and thus independent of her subjective reality (Fletcher 2016: 156-57). I would assert, however, that these objective values contribute to the well-being of all residents, because they construct a frame that has enough space to be filled with individual ways of benefitting from it. For example, how someone uses their freedom is less important than being able to enjoy the gift of being free in the first place. Likewise, how someone construes meaning in their life is up to the individual, but engaging in meaning-making acts nonetheless leads to well-being.

Let us now have a closer look at each value and define what it means, how it applies to animals, and how it is usually withheld from animals living on farms, before turning to the two sanctuary models and exploring how they can contribute to their residents’ well-being through providing these goods.

4.2.1 Freedom

Freedom, or liberty[13], can be viewed to mean different things. First, it can mean to be free from restraint, second, it can imply that someone is able to control her own actions, or third, it can suggest the absence of arbitrary interference (Gruen 2011: 141). Whether animals have an intrinsic interest in freedom has been much debated in the philosophical literature. While some authors claim that animals lack the necessary preconditions to be autonomous agents and thus do not have an intrinsic interest in liberty (Cochrane 2009), others defend the view that animals, like humans, indeed have this interest, as definitions of autonomy and liberty differ. In Giroux' view, liberty is intrinsically valuable for animals in its negative sense, as "for individuals to have an interest in negative liberty, nothing more is required than for other people's interference to cause them harm by keeping them from doing what they want" (2016: 33). Thus, animals do not need to be able "to frame, revise, and pursue their own conceptions of the good" (Cochrane 2009: 661), as Cochrane claims. Another way of upholding an intrinsic interest in liberty for animals, rather than a merely instrumental one, is by questioning what is needed to be an autonomous agent. Since most animals can make their own choices about "what to do, when to do it, and who to do it with" (Gruen 2011: 148), they can be seen to be autonomous in a less strict interpretation of the term. Freedom is thus constitutive of animals' well-being, as arbitrary interference (that were not in the animal's interest) would cause harm, the same as restraining or taking away control over their actions would.

In animal agriculture, freedom is routinely taken away from domestic animals. There are numerous examples for all of freedom's dimensions, including the physical restraining of cows in tie-stalls or the crating of mother sows; the barren environments in pig or broiler chicken farming that leave only the choice to feed and grow; or the mere fact that all of these animals are born into dominion as production units that will sooner rather than later be killed at the will of the farmer. Even under conditions that could be said to be more 'animal friendly', like extensive cattle keeping or the use of mobile chicken homes with outdoor

[13] Terms will be used interchangeably.

access, the animals enjoy only a relative freedom that is limited to their (re-)productive life span and does not involve any real choices about how to lead their lives or to even continue these lives after they have served their production purpose. Thus, no animal that is used in for-profit animal agriculture can be said to be free in the positive nor the negative sense of the term.[14]

When thinking about freedom for animals, it is not only important to think about whether they potentially hold an interest in this value, but whether domestic animals can even be free precisely because of their domestication status. Some scholars, like Gary Francione, argue that because animals have been created to serve human purposes via domestication, they can never be free and "exist forever in a netherworld of vulnerability, dependent on us for everything" (2012: para. 5). If we look at this issue more closely, however, we can see that just because someone is dependent on someone else, it does not per se mean that this someone is unfree or lacks the ability to be free. As D&K insist, "it is a mistake to assume that 'real' freedom requires self-sufficiency. All of us, in different ways and at different points in time, require the help of others to exercise our self-determination and citizenship" (2015a: 64). Thus, domestic animals can enjoy freedom despite being dependent.

In a sanctuary context, the term 'freedom' frequently appears and can not only be found in sanctuary names,[15] but is often used to mean the freedom from exploitation and human use, as many sanctuaries are set up to combat these practices. The *refuge + advocacy* model explicitly accommodates for this, as reflected in their principle of *Non-Exploitation* (ibid.: 51). The *intentional community* model is also built around principles that forbid exploitation, but may not be so strict when it comes to conceptions of 'using' animals in a way that might benefit humans while not harming the animals involved (ibid.: 61-62). We will go into more detail on this in section 4.2.4 on Meaning. Another way of looking at freedom entails freedom

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[14] Here, positive liberty means to be able to act upon one's desire and negative freedom implies that someone is free from external interference or restraint.

[15] Examples include: *Freedom Farm Sanctuary*, *Freedom Hill Sanctuary*, *Return to Freedom*, or *Farm of the Free Animal Sanctuary*

in terms of space and association with members of other species. As this depends on the way the sanctuary is spatially set up, there will be different opportunities for residents to be free in this sense. *Refuge + advocacy* sanctuaries usually restrict their residents' mobility. While practices differ, even in the best cases sanctuaries confine the animals to the area of the sanctuary in order to keep them safe and ensure that care can be provided. Thus, the setup also entails implications about the possibility for interspecies encounters and friendships. The topic of spatial sanctuary design and its connection to the value of friendship will be discussed in section 4.2.2 on Friendship. Nevertheless, just because animals are confined to a fixed space does not necessarily mean that this infringes upon their freedom to make choices and act in ways that are desirable to them. To illustrate this, we could imagine a small island that provides habitat to a population of terrestrial mammals. Let us assume that these animals cannot swim and are therefore unable to leave this island. Yet, they find everything they need to thrive there. Even though their mobility is restricted and they are confined to the island, they are not unfree, and so animals living at sanctuaries can also be free despite being confined.

A third way of scrutinizing freedom in sanctuaries is therefore to question whether and how residents can exercise their autonomy. Sezgin (2014: 179) defines autonomy as having and pursuing your own individual good and being entitled to do so or, referring back to Gruen's definition, it can mean to be able to decide "what to do, when to do it, and who to do it with" (2011: 148). As r*efuge + advocacy* sanctuaries usually employ strict routines and sometimes unwanted medical procedures, and because domestic animals are usually dependent on this care, there are scholars that refer to these animals' freedom as not being true freedom (Giroux 2016: 39) or call it outright "fake" (Jones 2014: 94). Since *refuge + advocacy* sanctuaries emphasize safety and care with a hierarchical caregiver-patient dynamic, this model risks enacting paternalism in ways that are uncalled for and thus potentially violates residents' autonomy. On the other hand, both Jones (ibid.: 92) and Giroux (2016: 39) acknowledge that domestic farm animals can usually not survive on their own[16]

[16] Of course, this depends on species-specific as well as individual attributes.

and that paternalism can be justified if it “aims at serving the interests of the individual herself” (ibid.).

The most important aspect, therefore, seems to be what opportunities for the exercise of autonomy a sanctuary provides to its residents. These could range from giving options to choose from, for example in- and outdoor sleeping places and ample space to explore, retreat, or connect with others, to learning about individuals and respecting as well as encouraging their personal ways of being. The *intentional community* model tries to alleviate the risks of paternalism by means of employing all of their six principles to move away from the total institution character of r*efuge + advocacy* FASes (D&K 2015a: 63-64). Especially important is the *Absence of fixed hierarchical relationships,* so that every member of the community can simultaneously be giving and receiving care, and the principle of *Self-Determination,* to ensure that every individual has the opportunity to examine their mode of living and adding to the community (ibid.: 64). Both models, therefore, hold great potential to offer justice via the provision of different dimensions of freedom to their residents. The *refuge + advocacy* model could benefit from considering to reduce their emphasis on safety, which will lead to less control but greater freedom, while the *intentional community* model could pave the way to new ideas about interspecies living in regard to freedom.

4.2.2 Friendship

When looking at objective values for humans, friendship or loving relationships are oftentimes among those listed (Fletcher 2016: 152). It is not only an important objective value for humans, however, as domestic animals are usually social animals with a desire and need for companionship. This circumstance is not a coincidence, as it serves as one of the behavioral preconditions for selecting a species suitable for domestication and human use (Price 1984: 8). Hence, animals like horses, pigs, and cattle live in herds and chickens and turkeys live in flocks with other members of their species, some of which are usually also family members. Although this section is termed ‘Friendship', it means to include other

valuable relationships besides those with conspecifics and family members, such as those with members of other species, including humans. In her list of animal capabilities, Nussbaum (2007: 398-400) lists this value under *Affiliation* as well as *Other Species*. She emphasizes the importance of animals being able to affiliate with members of their own species as well as with members of other species, including humans. As can be seen here, we can make a distinction between allowing for 1) intraspecies contact, 2) interspecies contact, and within this, 3) contact with humans.

In profit-oriented agriculture, relationships between animals are routinely broken up, sometimes before they can even form: calves are taken from their mothers just after they are born, piglets are also prematurely separated from their mothers, cow and cattle herds are regularly mixed according to production goals, chicks are raised entirely without mothers, and chickens and turkeys are kept in groups so large that functioning pecking orders cannot develop, as they are no longer able to recognize every member of the group. All of these practices cause great distress to the animals involved and thus lead to suffering. Most animals are also kept in groups consisting solely of members of their own species, therefore not allowing for any interspecies contact with other nonhuman animals. When it comes to interspecies relationships with humans, some farmer-animal relationships can sometimes be seen as friendships, but as there is a "radical power imbalance" (Scotton 2017b: 101), since the farmer ultimately holds dominion over the life and death of his animals, these relationships cannot be plausibly viewed as genuine friendships (ibid.).

After looking at the importance of friendship for farm animals and how it is usually withheld in modern agriculture, let us now turn to see how this value can be realized at FASes. As domestic animals rely on bonds and hierarchies for protection, well-being, and sometimes generating meaning,[17] it is crucial that they are able to act out this value in sanctuary contexts. There are two technical factors related to sanctuary setup and management that determine the possibilities for residents to engage with others. First, there is the question of how the

[17] More on this in section 4.2.3 on Meaning.

sanctuary is structured. Are animals kept segregated by species in separate enclosures? Or can they roam freely on sanctuary premises? Sanctuary setups, of course, exist on a continuum from total segregation to completely free access, also depending on the species in question, and most FASes lie somewhere between the two extremes. Second, there is the issue of visitor policy. Does the sanctuary allow or even encourage regular visitation? Or do they keep to themselves and have very little visitor traffic coming through? To illustrate how sanctuaries differ in terms of spatial design and visitor policies, we will look at two existing sanctuaries and how they negotiate space and interspecies encounters.

The first sanctuary, *Hof Narr*,[18] is located in Hinteregg, close to Zurich in Switzerland. On *Hof Narr*, horses, goats, pigs, rabbits, ducks, turkeys, chickens, cats, and dogs have found a permanent home. Except for the chickens, rabbits, and ducks, who share their territory, the other animals mostly live in intraspecies groups in their own enclosures. This means that especially the horses, pigs, and goats are usually barred from getting into contact with other nonhuman residents. Exceptions are two of the younger pigs, who are sometimes taken on walks together with the dogs. Since it is possible to visit this sanctuary, however, and tours for students and other interested visitors can be booked (Hof Narr 2019: 4; 23), the animals get to be in contact with many different humans, who can get up close and for example brush the pigs or pet the goats.[19]

The other sanctuary, *Hof Butenland*, is located close to the North Sea in Butjadingen in Germany. On *Hof Butenland*, which calls itself a retirement home for former dairy cows, there are also horses, pigs, geese, chickens, rabbits, ducks, cats, and dogs. Except for the rabbits, who live in their own enclosure with ample space to dig and explore, the other animals are largely free to roam the vast meadows, rest in the stables, or make a visit to the yard.

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[18] This sanctuary's name is a pun of words as it means 'court jester', combining the German words for farm (Hof) and jester (Narr). The name is supposed to refer to the sanctuary founders, staff, and supporters as fools, as they believe in the idea of a better world for animals, basically reclaiming this term in a positive sense (Hof Narr 2019: 4).

[19] This depiction of the spatial circumstances at *Hof Narr* is mostly based on observations that I made during a visit in August of 2019 and makes no claims to be 100% correct.

Interspecies encounters are thus possible and common. One example includes Rosa-Mariechen, a sow who did not want to spend time with the other pigs but rather chose to live with the cows instead (Hof Butenland n.d.d). On the other hand, *Hof Butenland* has a strict policy when it comes to visitors. The founders only allow up to eight visitors, which need to be the godparents[20] of one or more animals, on two days per month, mainly due to safety considerations as well as to allow the sanctuary owners to devote their time to running the sanctuary and caring for the residents (Hof Butenland n.d.e). Therefore, the residents are able to develop relationships with the founders and staff members, but do not get into regular contact with other humans.

Now that we have examined how encounters are managed at two existing sanctuaries, we will analyze how *refuge + advocacy* FASes and *intentional community* sanctuaries can encourage the building of bonds that lead to friendships as well as other valuable relationships. Here, I will compare the models by first looking at 1) intraspecies friendship, then 2) nonhuman interspecies amity, and finally 3) human-animal relationships. What *refuge + advocacy* FASes usually have in common is that they maintain stable animal groups where hierarchies can be established and maintained and intraspecies friendships can form and flourish. Also, offspring that is born at the sanctuary can stay with their mothers for however long they choose. This sometimes leads to very strong bonds, as in the case of cow Dina and her son Mattis from *Hof Butenland*, who can rarely be seen apart. Dina escaped from a neighboring farmer when she was close to giving birth and Mattis was not only born free, but the first calf that Dina was allowed to keep (Hof Butenland n.d.f). The *intentional community* model would similarly contribute to intraspecies bonds.

When it comes to interspecies friendships, sanctuary setup plays a crucial role, as we have already established. When encounters between animals of different species are possible, however, examples are also numerous in this regard. Besides Rosa-Mariechen from *Hof Butenland*, another example involves Shadow, a sheep living at *VINE Sanctuary*, who “rarely

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[20] Godparents are people who financially support the sanctuary by sponsoring one or more residents for varying amounts of time.

spends time with her fellow sheep, preferring to associate with members of many other species rather than integrating with the flock" (Van Patter, Bachour & Chang unpublished ms: 13). As can also be seen with the two sanctuaries mentioned earlier, considerations about interspecies encounters oftentimes entail deliberations about safety measures related to e.g. sanctuary location and species. As *Hof Butenland* is located rather remotely, the risks of letting their geese, chickens, and ducks roam freely are minimized. *Hof Narr,* on the other hand, is located close to a road, which would pose risks for these animals to be run over. Moreover, small animals like rabbits are usually kept enclosed to, again, ensure safety and keep them from escaping. An *intentional community* model would, as is reflected in its principle of *Self-Determination*, try to negotiate space and encounters more freely with less focus on safety and more on opportunity and choice. As D&K write:

> "We should first attempt to determine what sort of social life an animal wants to have, including their preferences to be part of an interspecies (or breed, or sex) community, and then support these preferences through creative design of space and structures to support choice, while limiting risk" (2015a: 58).

Human-animal contact in *refuge + advocacy* FASes can, as we have seen, differ especially due to visitor policies. While some FASes decide to establish advocacy and education programs based on human-nonhuman encounters, others choose to limit external visitors and instead focus solely on reaching out through social media and other more remote means. In *refuge + advocacy* sanctuaries that rely on hierarchies between human staff and animal residents, these structures could impede the formation of true friendship between caregiver and care receiver. On the other hand, in particular regular encounters, as those between staff and residents, can strengthen bonds and ultimately lead to special fondness, as in the case of Erna the pig[21] and Indira the apprentice, who met on *Hof Butenland* and soon spent almost every lunch break together (Hof Butenland 2019b). When it comes to visitors, the formation of friendships may thus be impeded by the briefness of the encounter. But as Van Patter and colleagues (unpublished ms: 21-23) report, even a couple of visits can reveal preferences for

[21] Deceased in December of 2019.

certain humans expressed by residents that may lead to friendship formation, as illustrated by turkey Hypatia who "would follow me [Omar Bachour] around tirelessly" and "rest her body against mine so closely, I could feel her breathing" (ibid.: 22). In all of these instances, it is indeed of importance that all parties involved always have the chance to enter and exit these situations at will and make choices about who to engage with and who to avoid. In an *intentional community* model there are no clear rules regarding visitation, but it is important to note that the absence of hierarchies could pave the road to genuine friendship between different community members. As these would be encouraged to stay and live inside these communities, the probability for budding friendships rises. Scotton even argues for a human duty to socialize with domesticated species and explores sanctuaries as "pioneering sites of interspecies amity" (2017b: 92). He stresses the importance of meeting the other (social) needs of these animals, however, like spending time with their group or alone (ibid.: 95), while also paying attention to "the diverse needs of humans with, for instance, different social capacities, animal phobias, or traumatic experiences related to animals" (ibid.: 97). Scotton concludes that "[t]he successful pursuit of this duty in a sanctuary setting will depend, in part, on how such projects are integrated with the running of the sanctuary, and with other education and outreach initiatives" (ibid.: 102). As this makes even clearer, both models hold great potential to show others that human-animal bonds cannot only form with animals commonly known to do so, like dogs, but that also other species have not only the ability but also the desire to engage in such relationships with humans, when paying careful attention to human and nonhuman inclinations.

4.2.3 Political Participation

Although this value does not commonly appear in objective list theories, it has been argued that political participation is an important factor contributing to the well-being of citizens (Sen 1999). Through participating in decision-making processes, citizens and community members can actively shape their surroundings and might gain well-being in the process. Independent

of actual outcomes, however, Drèze and Sen argue that "[p]articipation can also be seen to have intrinsic value for the quality of life. Indeed, being able to do something through political action—for oneself or for others—is one of the elementary freedoms that people have reason to value" (2002: 359). Therefore, when speaking about political participation, I do not only mean voting for representatives, which is sometimes used to derail the entire conversation on animals and politics, but playing an active role in political discourse. Nussbaum includes political participation in her list of capabilities under *Control over one's environment*. Here, she makes an important distinction between humans and animals, however: where for humans, this capability includes "active citizenship and rights of political participation" (2007: 400), like "protections of free speech and association" (ibid.: 77), animals are pushed towards a more passive role as they are only "part of a political conception that is framed so as to respect them and that is committed to treating them justly" (ibid.: 400). Even though Nussbaum's demand can be seen as an important step forward, as animals are currently oftentimes neither treated justly nor with respect, her view resembles contemporary animal rights activism, where animals are portrayed as voiceless and passive victims of violence, not being able to stand up for themselves (Meijer 2017: 208; Driessen 2014: 90).

Meijer, on the other hand, argues that animals do indeed have voices and also language (2017: 213), expressed not only by vocalizations but also through visual and olfactory signals, like distinct bodily movements and facial expressions, changing color patterns on their skin, or odor cues (2019: 52 & 54). She insists, however, that "[w]e can only study nonhuman animal languages properly if we let go of the idea of human language as the only true language" (2017: 213). Thus, we need to move away from our preconceived ideas about animals as voiceless and instead find ways to let them actively engage in processes of (political) deliberation as well as acknowledge that animals have been political all along. Meijer writes: "Political nonhuman animal agency has in recent years been described and conceptualized in different ways: as resistance and protest, cooperation with humans, voting with the feet, negotiating, and bargaining" (ibid.: 208). When it comes to resistance and

protest as forms of political agency, Hribal (2007, 2010) has done much work explaining how animals at zoos and circuses, but also on farms engage in it: he talks about cows who refuse to be milked, pigs that escape their enclosures, and horses who damage equipment (2007: 103). Other examples include animals escaping slaughter, like pig Victoria, who jumped from a livestock transporter (Erdlingshof n.d.b), or bull Ferdinand, who was just seconds away from being stunned and killed at a slaughterhouse when he was able to free himself and hide in a nearby forest where he could not be found for several days, before *Erdlingshof* founder Johannes Jung brought him to his sanctuary (Erdlingshof n.d.c).

When framed in terms of resistance and protest, also animals living under standard animal agriculture conditions can and do display political agency, as explained above. There are three issues, however, that I would like to address, which either derogate farm animals' possibilities to show these behaviors or negate their intention. First, for some animal species, like broiler chickens, factors related to their genetic makeup, husbandry system, and management style lead to diminished possibilities for them to engage in escape attempts, violence against humans, or other related acts. Second, the process of domestication has made all domesticated animals more calm and compliant in general. Nevertheless, there are even suggestions to genetically select for even more docility to ostensibly increase animal welfare (Murphy & Kabasenche 2018: 230). This could, however, lead humans to believe that compliance induced by these processes implies consent rather than an inability to display more fierce behaviors. Lastly, even if animals show resistance, with some even killing and injuring humans, these acts are usually not framed as political acts and displays of political agency, but rather as isolated cases or instances that are out of the ordinary, as highlighted by Hribal (2010). In the following paragraphs we will examine how animals can display political agency apart from resistance and violence and how sanctuaries can incorporate their residents into decision-making processes.

In 2011, D&K published their book *Zoopolis*, which depicts in detail a political conception that also includes nonhuman animals and grants them not only passive rights but also active political agency. Here, the authors propose a citizenship model for domestic animals to better

incorporate them into society. They argue that domestic animals can be awarded citizenship status because, similarly to people with severe intellectual disabilities, "they can and have a subjective good; they can comply with schemes of social cooperation; and they can participate as agents in social life—without being capable of rational reflection" (ibid.: 108). Moreover, they explain that animals express their subjective good through agency, for example indicating when they want to be petted or go for a walk, as everyone who has ever lived with a domestic animal has surely noticed (ibid.: 108-109). When it comes to political agency, the authors explain how the sheer presence of animals in public spaces can serve as a "catalyst for political deliberation" (ibid.: 114). D&K (ibid.) use the example of dogs being mostly absent from public spaces in North America, but traveling on public transport and being taken to restaurants in France. We could imagine a similar scenario with other domestic animals, which seems absurd now, but could become a new normal in the future.[22] Thus, D&K (ibid.) grant animals a more active role when it comes to participating politically than does Nussbaum, by portraying them as agents with a subjective good.

At *refuge + advocacy* sanctuaries, residents are similarly seen as individuals with the capacity for agency, but also as victims and as ambassadors. Whether this is problematic or not, depends on what status receives the most attention. Primarily seeing residents as victims can be problematic, as sanctuaries run the risk of letting their residents' victim status underscore their perceived passivity and voicelessness. Alternatively, Meijer suggests that "viewing other animals as political groups, instead of simply as victims […] opens up new strategic, political, and legal channels to challenge their oppression" (2019: 196). Therefore, if residents' agency is acknowledged, framing them as ambassadors for animals still living within the system of animal agriculture could be argued to achieve exactly those two points: they are elevated from a purely victim-focussed position to that of a political group, and it grants them active agency by enacting their ambassador status through living life on their own terms. Thereby, they convey to the public that also farm animals have personalities and through their everyday way of being they act as the aforementioned catalyst for personal and political change.

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[22] More on this in Chapter 5.

Additionally, there are several methods that sanctuaries can employ to scrutinize decision-making processes, two of which I will briefly mention and one of which I will elaborate on in more depth. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and paralleling what D&K write about animal visibility as discussed above, making decisions at FASes in the presence of animals is one way to achieve participation as one part of the *Citizenship* principle of the *intentional community* model (D&K 2015a: 67), which could nevertheless also be utilized by *refuge + advocacy* FASes. Another way proposed by D&K (ibid.) is the appointment of an animal advocate, who represents residents and their interests. This approach can be seen to resemble animal rights efforts, where humans speak for the animals and is, again, not granting animals a truly active role, but could also be employed by both models.

A third way to achieve participation that is more active than the aforementioned approaches is through *Dependent agency*, another one of the *intentional community* model's principles, which puts its focus on "agency that is exercised in and through relations with particular others in whom they trust, and who have the skills and knowledge needed to recognize and assist the expression of agency" (D&K 2011: 104). This requires humans, who know the residents well and have the time and capacity to actually engage in this assistance, which could be realized at FASes where there are enough human community members so that no nonhuman member is overlooked. There are also problems with the concept of dependent agency, however. Meijer highlights, for example, that "not all domesticated animals want to (or can) have close relationships with humans" (2016: 104). In a sanctuary setting, especially with regard to the principle of *Self-Determination*, this means that every animal needs to be able to choose her companions and it has to be accepted if humans are not among them, therefore also not allowing for dependent agency. Moreover, she suggests that dependent agency is always enacted between two individuals, not taking into account "how domesticated animals can as a group discuss issues or make political changes" (ibid.: 105) and that it would surely change power dynamics if animals could band together in this way (ibid.), which is certainly an interesting objection to be explored. Lastly, her most important point, as mentioned above, is that animals have language and also culture and that they communicate in

their unique ways with members of their species but also with other species (ibid.: 104). Therefore, "[i]nstead of turning to humans who know them well, we should extend human political institutions and procedures to incorporate their voices" (ibid.). For sanctuaries this means that they need to find ways to communicate with their residents, to hear their voices, and to make them count. This is not a trivial task—requiring time, effort, creativity, and persistence in order to do justice to animals' political agency. I am hopeful, however, that sanctuaries are the right places to start exploring how domestic animals can and want to actively participate in decision-making processes regarding them as well as in shaping politics so that they will be treated justly in the future.

4.2.4 Meaning

Leading a meaningful life or living with purpose is something that many humans strive for and which can therefore also be found in some objective list theories of well-being (Purves & Delon 2018: 335). This value, however, is generally thought to be one that can only be acquired by humans or, since animals do not possess human language and therefore have no concept of 'meaning', is of no relevance to them (Monsó & Benz-Schwarzburg unpublished ms: 2). Purves and Delon (2018) argue, however, that animals indeed have the ability to generate and enjoy meaning in their lives. According to them, someone's life is meaningful when this someone by intentional action contributes to a valuable situation (ibid.: 324). Here, it is not important that the acting subject intended the final outcome but that she put some kind of effort into her actions, also stating that sometimes the action in itself may be valuable no matter its actual impact (ibid.: 324-325). In the authors' words: "The exercise of effortful perceptual agency that contributes to value is sufficient for meaning. Because animals can act intentionally, and can expend varying degrees of effort in contributing to valuable outcomes, they can have meaningful lives" (ibid.: 332). Monsó and Benz-Schwarzburg (unpublished ms) agree that animals can lead meaningful lives but argue that effort is not enough to generate meaning and that what is needed in addition is a fitting motivation behind those actions (ibid.:

9). They write: “It’s not enough for the state of affairs that we generate with our effortful (perceptual) agency to be valuable, it has to be something we care about to some extent for it to add meaning to our lives” (ibid.: 9-10). This addition to Purves and Delon’s definition is important, as one can easily imagine that, for example, chickens, who contribute to the gustatory enjoyment of scrambled eggs, could not care less about human cuisine and consequently do not actually derive meaning from their undoubtedly effortful action of laying eggs. Nonetheless, both accounts leave room for a variety of meaning-generating actions that animals can perform and extract meaning from and which in turn may contribute to their well-being. These may include raising and caring for young as well as establishing and maintaining bonds with members of their own and other species (Purves & Delon 2018: 334) or performing work like guarding a territory or other animals (D&K 2015a: 62). We will examine all of these examples when comparing the sanctuary models, but let us first have a look at why animals in profit-oriented agriculture are deprived of meaning.

Even though we have established that animals can lead meaningful lives, under exploitative conditions like standard practice animal agriculture they are barred from doing so. This is precisely because “we have placed so many of them in conditions that make a meaningful life unattainable. We have done this by restraining their agency, disrupting their social environment and thwarting their natural behaviors” (Purves & Delon 2018: 336). Therefore, because these animals have very little room to exercise any agency and engage in actions that they care about, their lives are devoid of meaning. On the other hand, one could argue that since the raising of offspring can bring about meaning and many female animals, like sows and beef cattle, have the opportunity to raise their young (at least for a while), these animals’ lives can have some meaning in them. In opposition to this stands the strict planning of these females’ reproductive activities. Since they are merely means of (re-)production, they exist on a schedule where everything is controlled—from their own birth, to their (usually) artificial impregnation, to the conditions under which they will give birth, to how long their babies will stay with them, and so on. Thus, there is very little room for displaying agency and acting upon intrinsic motivations, which holds true even under the very best conditions.

Let us now turn to analyze how sanctuary residents can have meaning in their lives. One possibility, as mentioned above, is the creation of friendships, which has also been discussed in section 4.2.2. By engaging in social behaviors towards others, meaningful bonds can be established and add meaning and thus well-being to an animal's life. Another possibility is the rearing of offspring. Since *refuge* + *advocacy* sanctuaries follow a *Non-perpetuation* principle, this activity will most likely not be carried out by most of the residents and only apply to those that were already pregnant when they came to the sanctuary. It could be the case, however, that very young animals are rescued who can then be taken under the wing by an experienced resident, as has for example been the case with Madame Michèle, a sow living at *Hof Narr*, who is currently caring for three of the younger pig residents, providing warmth, protection, and piglet education (hof_narr_in 2020). Members of an *intentional community* model sanctuary could also generate meaning in both of these ways, as there is also room for the animals to be caregivers to human and nonhuman others. Depending on the circumstances, some members might also engage in procreative activities themselves (D&K 2015a: 60). The question of whether (some) residents should be allowed to reproduce, however, is a complex one and will be picked up again in Chapter 5.

When it comes to performing work, D&K (2015a: 62) stress that many *refuge* + *advocacy* model sanctuaries are very critical, as they want to avoid continued exploitation of their animals. However, they argue that

> "[i]f the purpose of the activity is to support animals in finding meaning and purpose, in fulfilling their desire to be active, to develop skills, and to be contributing members of the community, then far from exploiting animals, it may be supporting a crucial dimension of their flourishing" (ibid.: 61-62).

They go on to suggest several activities that animals might want to engage in that do not need to be exploitative despite also being of value to human and other community members (ibid.: 63). If we stick to Monsó and Benz-Schwarzburg's (unpublished ms) definition of how an animal can add meaning to her life, however, many of the proposed activities would not

qualify to achieve this. An example would be a sheep, whose wool needs to be shorn and could be used as income for the sanctuary (D&K 2015a: 63). This cannot be seen to add meaning to the sheep's life, because she was not motivated to grow wool in order for products to be made from it and therefore does not care about the unquestionably valuable outcome that has been created by this. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that in *refuge + advocacy* model as well as *intentional community* model sanctuaries, animals could be encouraged to explore behaviors that come naturally to them. One possibility would be overtaking a social role, like guardian, where residents engage in monitoring, alarming, or policing others and break up conflicts (Blattner, Donaldson & Wilcox 2020: 9-10). Concrete examples include dogs Storm and Trickster from *VINE Sanctuary*, who protect other residents from predators, or cow Equinox who kept a watchful eye on visiting researchers, so that other residents did not have to and could forage unperturbedly (ibid.: 10). Apart from this, residents could also learn new skills and potentially generate meaning through them if they contribute any value. In an *intentional community* sanctuary especially, these opportunities could be created via *Dependent agency*, which could serve to reveal an animal's individualistic dispositions, which could then be nurtured to result in activities that create meaning.

All in all, sanctuaries following either model can be great places for providing domestic animal residents not only with a right to life and lifelong care to ensure hedonistic well-being, but also with many other values that were withheld from them in their past. I illustrated four of these goods and how sanctuaries can either practice them right away or start thinking about their own ways of creating well-being through applying them at their establishments, and thus do the work of justice in the present while at the same time sowing seeds of change that will blossom in the future. What this future could look like will be the topic of the next chapter.

5 Future

As defenders of animal rights and the just treatment of animals, many sanctuary founders, workers, supporters, and other likeminded humans imagine a future where animals are not farmed for their bodies and what they produce. Therefore, in this chapter we will primarily travel to the imaginary period when standard animal agriculture has been abolished and the pressing ethical question is now what relationship we, as humans, should have to domesticated farm animals.[23] Although it remains, of course, speculative whether we will ever reach this point, I believe that it is worth discussing such a future, especially because envisioning a goal helps reaching it. The exact question of how to reach this point, including concerns regarding economic implications or political hurdles, will be bracketed, however, as it would go beyond the scope of this thesis.

If sketched roughly, there are two options as to what our future with domestic animals could look like. Option one would be what D&K (2011: 77) call 'extinctionism', where all remaining domesticated animals are barred from reproducing and will therefore ultimately go extinct. Option two would be a continued co-existence of humans and domesticated nonhumans, with a variety of forms this could take. One of these forms is called 'rewilding' or 'de-domestication', whereby domesticated animals are bred back to regain the ability to survive on their own and "reclaim their ancestors' ecological role" (Vermeulen 2015: 9). Another alternative are interspecies communities, where domestic animals are incorporated into human environments, with D&K's (2011) political theory, which extends citizenship rights to these animals, being a prominent example for this second scenario. For the purposes of this thesis, I selected interspecies communities to represent option two, because 'rewilding' would again subject animals to selective breeding efforts and is not done for reasons of justice but to "develop a natural and dynamic ecosystem" (Gamborg, Gremmen, Christiansen &

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[23] I am of course aware that, to achieve this goal, there need to be steps taken now up until this scenario has been realized, and some of the ideas that I am going to discuss can be applied before the end of animal farming, but I also think that the question of what to do with domesticated farm animals will become more relevant the closer we get to it.

Sandøe 2010: 58). Nevertheless, careful ‘de-domestication’ efforts could be incorporated also into interspecies community plans if they conform with them from a justice perspective.

In this chapter, I will explore ‘extinctionism’ as well as interspecies communities and elaborate on whether these concepts are a just solution for the future and how they are connected to FASes. The following section 5.1 will explain the concept of ‘extinctionism’, how sanctuaries relate to this concept, and implications for measures connected to the prevention of reproduction. In section 5.2 on interspecies communities, I will address the question of how animals might want to live with us and how sanctuaries can be great places to gain insight regarding this. Moreover, I will highlight the importance of imagining domestic animals in places other than typical farming environments when envisioning future scenarios of shared spaces and will then reiterate the six principles of the *intentional community* model and apply them to a broader conception of interspecies community, which goes beyond the bounded conception of a sanctuary.

5.1 Extinctionism

To prevent animals from being harmed, some animal rights proponents call for the severance of all relationships to nonhuman animals. This school of thought is commonly called ‘abolitionism’—a term borrowed from the movement striving to end human slavery. Its application to animal rights was famously brought about by law and philosophy professor Gary Francione, who bases his abolitionist theory on six principles: 1) sentient beings are not property, 2) all animal exploitation practices need to be abolished instead of regulated, 3) veganism, 4) animals’ moral status is based on sentience, 5) the rejection of all kinds of human discrimination, and 6) nonviolence (Francione & Charlton n.d.). Even though it is not directly implied by these principles, Francione holds the opinion that with regard to domesticated animals we should strive for their extinction because our relationship to them “can never be ‘natural’ or ‘normal’” and “[t]hey do not belong stuck in our world irrespective of how well we treat them” (2012: para. 5). To refer to this part of Francione’s position, D&K

(2011: 272-273) coined the term ‘extinctionism’, which is, according to them, to be used interchangeably with ‘abolitionism’. Albersmeier, however, cautions not to automatically intermingle these terms and rather use ‘abolitionism’ when referring “to the normative assumption that a given social practice should be declared illegal” (2014: 83) and to exclusively adopt ‘extinctionism’ “as the view that humans have the right (or even the obligation) to take measures to routinely prevent certain animals from reproducing, ultimately resulting in the extinction of this group of animals” (ibid.). Therefore, I titled this section ‘Extinctionism’, as it better alludes to the concept that I want to discuss.

When it comes to sanctuaries, most of them do not publicly advocate for the extinctionist position, although many do hold the view that after animal agriculture has been abolished, domesticated species should ultimately go extinct (D&K 2015a: 59-60). Hinting at this is not only the *Non-perpetuation* principle of *refuge* + *advocacy* FASes (ibid.), which we will discuss shortly, but also statements from various sanctuary leaders, who express their desire to reach a future when animal sanctuaries can disappear because they are no longer needed. For example, Miriam Jones, co-founder of *VINE Sanctuary*, states that “it is more than time to put sanctuary workers like me out of commission by rendering obsolete the reasons for our work” (2014: 100). Manuela Tietsch from *Tierschutzgemeinschaft Stellichte e.V.*, a sanctuary in Germany, phrases it even more explicitly: “[A]nimal keeping is to exist only for so long until all so-called pets and farmed animals have gone extinct” (2018: 23, translated by Alina). Therefore, the *Non-perpetuation* principle is to be seen not only in light of current animal farming practices and the resulting need for safe homes for formerly farmed animals, but also with regard to the idea of extinctionism (D&K 2015a: 60). In the following paragraphs, I will thus scrutinize this principle and address two objections to a comprehensive ban on reproduction.

While practices related to reproductive control, especially irreversible ones like castration, might be comprehensible in the present, where the priority is understandably put on those animals already in existence, they do “represent serious […] limitations on freedom and agency” (Blattner et al. 2020: 9) for the individual animal, who will (forever) be unable to

make the choice to reproduce.[24] Moreover, these practices are actually "problematic from a justice perspective" (ibid.: 8), not only because they restrict freedom and agency, but also because, as in the case of castration, they violate an animal's bodily integrity and, additionally, profoundly change their desires and behavior. Since the castration of sanctuary residents is usually done under anesthesia, there is also considerable risk for them to not only lose their reproductive abilities, but even more severely—their life. This so happened to sheep Heiko from *Erdlingshof* sanctuary, who did not wake up from his surgery at the beginning of April 2020 (Erdlingshof 2020). Without trying to insinuate that sanctuaries do not take good enough care of their residents, they should carefully weigh considerations about freedom, agency, and justice as well as potential risks for the individual associated with such irreversible procedures against possible safety concerns involving other residents (Blattner et al. 2020: 8), consequences for resulting offspring as well as considerations concerning the sanctuary's capacities in terms of the possible number of residents who can be provided with proper care.

Additionally, while prohibiting reproduction at *refuge + advocacy* FASes might be in line with their principles, at an *intentional community* sanctuary, these practices would not comply with the requirements of the principle of *Self-determination*. Again, not allowing every resident to procreate might be the best option as of right now, but, as D&K (2015a: 60) explain, barring every resident from reproducing might also not be necessary. While sexual desires could be "explored through same sex, non-reproductive or interspecies contacts and relationships" (ibid.), there is also the option of carefully assessing which residents might either benefit the most or display the most tenacity when it comes to rearing their own young. At *VINE Sanctuary*, for example,

> "[s]ome of the birds are able to brood, hatch, and raise their young, and they go to considerable effort to hide their nests, in or outside the sanctuary, in order to do

[24] There are also reversible measures like segregating animals by sex or preventing birds from incubating eggs, as mentioned in Chapter 2, but they still represent limitations in terms of freedom and agency and entail implications for, e.g., the formation of friendships.

> so. If they show this determination to parent, and demonstrate the savvy/ability to do so safely, VINE staff do not interfere with their reproductive freedom" (Blattner et al. 2020: 12).

Hence, there does not need to be a one-size-fits-all approach when it comes to managing sexual desires and there seem to be several ways to not only care for the residents' well-being but to treat them justly.

Furthermore, while measures related to reproductive control may be—to a certain extent—warranted in the present und near to midterm future, once animal farming has been abolished, it loses its primary justification, as there are no more animals needing to be rescued from animal farming practices. If connected to extinctionist visions, however, especially *refuge + advocacy* sanctuaries might want to stick to their principles and ultimately contribute to the extinction of domesticated animals. Therefore, other justifications to pursue this goal are necessary. When looking for these justifications, there seem to be two that are prevailing in animal rights discourse. The first one is concerned with animal exploitation and suffering and the second with dependency.

Animal exploitation and resulting suffering are commonly quoted by animal rights advocates as reasons to end animal farming. The extinctionist fraction of the abolitionist movement also uses it as an explanation as to why we should bring about the extinction of all domesticated animals. To them, being domesticated is automatically entangled with suffering and exploitation and thus warrants extinction in order to be saved from this fate. Raffaela Göhrig from *Endstation Hoffnung* sanctuary in Germany, for example, says extinction would be "for their own good" (2018: 24, translated by Alina), while describing her utopia as "free from animal suffering" (ibid.: 25, translated by Alina). While it is true that many animals suffer as a result of their genetic makeup and also because they are being used in animal farming, the conclusion that being domesticated automatically means that an animal is suffering and will be exploited does not follow. If the extinctionists' goal is to ensure that animals are not exploited, they could perhaps strive to change what people think about animals and instill the idea that, even though we domesticated animals to serve us, we are committing an injustice by

continuing these practices. Letting beings who are vulnerable to exploitation simply die out, however, seems unjust in itself, since they did nothing to deserve this treatment. Also, extinction is not proposed to protect other vulnerable beings, like children, who are instead safeguarded via laws and executive forces. Still, even these measures do not eliminate all suffering that is brought about by humans. Humans cause suffering by exploiting other humans and by destroying wild animals' habitats. If extinctionists really aimed to eliminate (animal) suffering, then they would also need to advocate for the extinction of humans and wild animals, since they are also suffering at the hand of humans. Although we sometimes seem to try our best to bring about our own extinction by making this planet unlivable, extinction does not seem to be the solution for human or wild animal suffering and neither extinctionists nor any other credible movement pursue this goal. So why should domesticated animals, but not anyone else, lose their right to exist and reproduce despite of all of them being vulnerable (at least during some phases of their lives) and able to suffer?

The second reason that is brought up to defend that domesticated animals should ultimately go extinct has to do with their dependency. As Francione's (2012: para. 9) argument goes, domesticated animals do not fit in our world, as they are "dependent on us for everything and at risk of harm from an environment that they do not really understand" (ibid.: 5). The second part of this quote also alludes to the risks posed by a human environment, which I interpret to mean abuse and suffering caused either by the agricultural industry or generally by humans in any other context.[25] Again, I reject that these risks should be used as a justification for the extinction of these animals, as illustrated above. Also, Francione seems to underestimate domestic animals' cognitive abilities when claiming that they do not understand their environment. While I would not deny that environments created by the modern agriculture industry, like concrete pig pens, might not be understood by their inhabitants, it is not in any way necessary that pigs be kept in these environments. Also, since I am arguing against extinctionism from a future perspective where artificial production environments are a relic of the past, these should not play a role in justifying the extinction of domestic animals. Furthermore, since domestic animals have lived with humans for thousands of years, they

[25] Surely, Francione could also refer to risks like road traffic, but domestic animals seem at no more or less risk here as wild and liminal animals.

have also adapted to living and interacting with humans, so unless I am incorrectly interpreting Francione's statement, I contest his view that domesticated animals are generally unable to understand their environment.

Let us now focus on his main point, however. Francione (ibid.) asserts that domestic animals have been created by humans to serve our interests and have thereby become dependent on human care. Although I agree with him on this, I challenge his deduction that extinctionism is the right way to handle these animals' dependency. First, we do not wish for the extinction of humans who are unable to take care of themselves due to, for example, severe cognitive impairments (D&K 2011: 83). Additionally, D&K (2015a: 64) argue that all of us are dependent in one way or the other; even as able-bodied adults who like to think of ourselves as very independent, if we think a little harder it gets painfully obvious that whenever the internet does not work or the power goes out or if there were no food in the supermarket, all of us are very dependent on our environment and on each other for a lot of things that we just take for granted. Yet, extinction seems not to be the answer.

Even though I understand the concerns that come with letting dependent beings reproduce and thereby create even more dependent beings, I think that we can think of better and more just solutions than simply leading them to extinction. Delon, for example, states that "reconstructing our relations to domesticated animals on a just basis can partly repair the historical injustices of domestication, unlike extinction" (unpublished ms: 6). For this to happen, however, we need to examine new concepts of how to live with domesticated animals that are not based on exploitation and mere human interests, but on fostering agency in order to understand how they do or do not want to live with us (Meijer 2017: 209). Therefore, carefully letting those domestic animals who are not interested in directly living with humans or only in living with us part-time regain the ability to take care of themselves could be a solution for some of them. Others could be integrated into our communities more closely while still being provided with care. Let us therefore discuss the concept of interspecies communities and the role that sanctuaries can play in this in the next section.

5.2 Interspecies Communities

When thinking about our society, we cannot deny that it actually already is an interspecies society. We share our space with pets, both domesticated and exotic, and with liminal animals, like pigeons, songbirds, rabbits, and many others. Farm animals tend to be more out of view, be it on farms or at sanctuaries. The concept of a true interspecies community would bring also the latter out of the shadows by carefully integrating them into our communities instead of segregating them. When trying to sketch such an interspecies community of the future, however, we will first need to figure out how domestic animals want to live with us. One possible approach to achieve this is called multispecies ethnography, a term referring to "work that acknowledges the interconnectedness and inseparability of humans and other life forms, and thus seeks to extend ethnography beyond the solely human realm" (Locke & Muenster 2015: 1). As a methodology, it can therefore be used to investigate intra- and interspecies relationships by observing other animals, while at the same time becoming a part of these observations oneself (Blattner et al. 2020: 5; Gillespie 2019: 22). Some of its goals are "to overcome anthropocentrism by pointing to the meaningful agency of nonhuman others, and to highlight the intersections between ecological relations, political economy, and cultural representations" (Locke & Muenster 2015: 1.). FASes can be especially fitting places when doing this kind of research in connection to domesticated animals and interspecies communities.

Blattner et al. (2020), for example, studied *VINE Sanctuary* in Vermont to gain insight into how domestic animals want to live with humans and therefore conducted such a multispecies ethnography. They chose *VINE Sanctuary*, because it "is a community in which animals' agency is (relatively) enabled rather than suppressed, and in which they have considerable opportunity to co-create social worlds with each other, and the humans who live with them" (ibid.: 1). During their observations, the researchers got to encounter the residents and the human members of the community, and were thereby themselves socialized as members of the community (ibid.: 11, 16). They also learned that some animals like to engage with (unknown) humans and do so frequently, while others keep their distance (ibid.: 16), and yet

others can even leave sanctuary premises and thus live life on their own terms, mostly independently of humans, to a great extent (ibid.: 7). While the authors agree that humans are not per se needed to constitute an interspecies community and to allow for animal agency, they conclude that

> "humans play a crucial role in actively fostering animals' agency—by responding to animals' expressed needs and wishes, through willingness to negotiate various dimensions of life in the community, and by ensuring a baseline of security and stability that underpins important dimensions of freedom" (ibid.: 17).

Similarly to the residents at *VINE Sanctuary*, in a future interspecies community, some animals might want to live closer to humans, independently of their need for care, while others might choose to roam and explore, with only sporadic or no contact with humans. Whatever mode of living they choose, it is important that these decisions are accepted, while at the same time making actual space for these decisions within our communities. In the following paragraphs I will therefore first illustrate the importance of showing and seeing animals in environments other than production environments in order to establish such communities, and then explain how the *intentional community* model's principles could be applied to a broader conception of interspecies community.

Since domestic farm animals are currently segregated at farms in the countryside, where they oftentimes live in closed-off buildings, not visible to the public, imagining them living freely in (sub-)urban or even rural areas is rather difficult. Nevertheless, Gillespie (2019), who chose *Pigs Peace Sanctuary* in Stanwood, Washington, for teaching an undergraduate university course on multispecies ethnography, highlights the importance of the environment that we see domestic farm animals in when thinking about them (ibid.: 21). She notes that sanctuaries can be spaces to explore "relationships that don't (and can't) occur in contexts where animals' lives are dictated by commodity logics" (ibid.), thereby offering a kickstart to imagining domestic animals and our relationship with them in a very different environment. However,

Pigs Peace Sanctuary is a place exclusively designed for pigs and therefore still outside of a truly mixed community (ibid.: 19-20).

Disrupting our view of domesticated farm animals and where they belong are also some of the paintings of artist Hartmut Kiewert, in which he depicts calves and pigs lying in front of picturesque wallpapers on parquet floors and living room carpets or scenes of urban living that are interspersed with lounging cows and passing pigs among playing children. According to Kiewert (2018: 8), by displaying animals and humans at eye level, he wants to elicit irritation in the observer and "instigate debates about where nonhuman animals are today and where they could be or should be" (ibid.: 11, translated by Alina). Thereby, situating animals outside of their usual environments and displaying them in unusual spaces opens up possibilities for humans to start imagining a different form of co-existence in a shared space.

While sanctuaries are currently seen as a counterweight to animal farming practices and, as we have learned, sanctuary founders and staff wish that they will someday be out of existence due to a lack of animals in need, they could also serve as blueprints for how the communities of the future could look like (D&K 2015a: 66). Therefore, while FASes can now and in the foreseeable future be "small-scale experiments in new forms of interspecies community and justice" (ibid.), when animal farming has been abolished, "justice for domesticated animals ultimately requires that these principles be applied at a societal level, and not just within intentional communities" (ibid.). The following paragraphs will therefore illustrate ideas as to how the *intentional community* model's principles could be implemented in future communities.

The first principle, *Belonging*, establishes the community as a resident's permanent home and aims to create some kind of equality between its members. In a larger community without fixed boundaries, this could mean that this principle is to be conceived of as more fluid than in a restricted conception of community, because some animal members might want to leave and explore other communities or primarily live further away from humans. This should not change anything about their equal status, however. A concept that calls for this equality is

called ‘Animal Mainstreaming’. It was formulated by philosopher Markus Wild, who defines it as follows:

> “Animal Mainstreaming aims to create a certain type of equality between humans and other vertebrates, namely the consideration of comparable interests, by incorporation of this goal into all relevant areas and as a central element in all decisions” (2019: 329-330, translated by Alina).

In his interpretation of Animal Mainstreaming with regard to an animal rights perspective, Wild specifically includes life and bodily integrity as two of these comparable interests (ibid.: 332), which, in my opinion, should be granted as a baseline for just interspecies living in the community of the future.

The second principle also alludes to the first in the way that it calls for equality between community members, this time from a care perspective, by maintaining the *Absence of fixed hierarchical relationships*. In order to implement this principle as well as the first, we would need to encourage a different perception of animals altogether. Instead of thinking of them as somehow inferior, we should continue to learn about their unique ways of being and cease to judge them according to human standards. This would require particular educational programs and efforts that should be conducted in schools but also in the family circle. For example, we could teach children about the many social roles that animals take on, be it guardians, friends, teachers/learners, parents, or others (Blattner et al. 2020: 9-12), some of which I also illustrated in Chapter 4.

The next principle is *Self-determination*, granting animals the freedom to be and live as they wish. Together with their interest in bodily integrity granted by the first principle, this could then also include the pursuit of reproduction. When it comes to the freedom of reproduction, D&K (2011: 144) compare the restriction on domestic animal reproduction to the human case, where it would be considered outrageous to limit people in the same way that we currently restrict animals. While suffering and dependency are reasons that are commonly brought up when discussing this issue with regard to animals, we do not apply the same measures to

humans or even wild animals, as explained in the previous section on extinctionism. Nevertheless, in a world without animal agriculture and, probably even more pressing, in our world right now, it would seem to be more rational to assess both—animal and human reproduction—in terms of sustainability, rather than letting humans reproduce rather freely while wanting to restrict animals wherever we can (Albersmeier 2014: 77). Therefore, we could aim for sustainable populations of domestic and feral animals within and around our communities, who would be left intact and thus able to reproduce, and at the same time subject to monitoring and, if they failed to balance out naturally, could be managed via non-invasive methods, like birth control. Additionally, we could carefully assess how to decrease dependency in animals by means of sustainability criteria that might, for example, not allow for the reproduction of animals who are known to only be able to deliver babies by C-Section. Surely, this approach would not get rid of all the suffering and dependency, but it could pave the way to letting domestic animals become less dependent and thereby slowly undo some of the injustices created by domestication.

The fourth principle is *Citizenship*, including "Protection, Provision, and Participation" (D&K 2015a: 64). Here, I would interpret Protection as meaning protection from human abuse, based on animals' interest in and rights to life and bodily integrity. These rights would need to be protected by law and upheld by local authorities, just as with humans, as also outlined by D&K (2011: 132-133). Moreover, humans could provide animals with shelters, structures, or other types of accommodation that keep them safe while asleep and might not be accessed by predators. Where I depart from D&K (ibid.: 133-134), however, is in the assumption that all domestic animals should be completely protected from predation by other animals, because this would interfere with the implementation of free reproduction and with sustainable population sizes. The reason that domestic animals, but not liminal or wild ones, should be afforded this protection according to D&K, is that we "brought such animals into our society" (ibid.: 134), which, I would argue, does not apply to freely reproducing domestic animals.[26]

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[26] Here, I would exclude the first generation of domestic animals, because these have indeed been brought into society by humans, and should therefore be afforded protection.

Additionally, my proposal relies on blurring the lines between domesticated and feral or liminal animals and therefore affords the application of these principles also to non-domesticated species.

When it comes to Provision, I would again emphasize sustainable population sizes that will depend on the community in question and very likely balance themselves out, as was observed with feral populations of dogs in Morocco, which bounced back to the area's carrying capacity after there had been a government coordinated instance of dog-culling to decrease the number of dogs in this area (Lazzaroni & Marshall-Pescini 2020). Therefore, the community could, for example, establish feeding places to sustain a certain population, which could also be used to monitor the animals and offer help, medical or otherwise, to animals in need.

For Participation, I already highlighted some crucial concepts in section 4.2.3 on Political Participation, especially learning about animal voices and taking them seriously. Therefore, if animals' agency and their interests are to be taken into account when establishing and shaping community life, there will need to be also political institutions, like an executive to enforce animals' rights, but also other political offices that keep in spirit with Animal Mainstreaming and consider animals' interests in every relevant aspect, like infrastructure, education, building activities, and others.

The next principle, *Dependent agency*, can not only play a role when it comes to direct political participation, as explained in section 4.2.3, but could also aid humans in other decision-making processes. Since this principle, on the one hand, depends on a close relationship, it might only be available to those animals that are actually interested in bonding with humans. On the other hand, also close observation of animals could give insights into their specific needs or wishes. Whether enacted in close or more remote interactions, however, dependent agency can be utilized to learn about an animal's preferences and character and can thereby further help to shape the community. This can apply to domestic as well as other animals, for example young squirrels, who have been known to seek out human

contact if they have been separated from their mothers and are in need of help (Rebhan 2018: 42).

The last principle emphasizes *Scaffolded choices and reconfigured spaces*. Both parts of this principle can be interpreted to allude to elements of spatial design. In an environment used by humans, space is usually designed to meet human needs and not those of animals. Interestingly, however, as the debate on the accessibility of public spaces highlights, it is not only not designed for animals—it is not even designed for all humans. Instead, it caters to the needs of those "who walk on two legs (instead of four, or use a wheelchair or a walker), whose sight lines are above five feet, who rely primarily on visual signs (instead of auditory or olfactory) or human language (rather than symbols or sign language)" (D&K 2011: 131). In a true interspecies community, however, the needs of all inhabitants should be taken into account. When it comes to areas outside of human settlements, in a world without animals used for agriculture, there would also be no need for vast areas used for growing feed. Some of these areas, arable land as well as grassland, could be re-wilded and thus populated by animals—wild, liminal, and domestic. But what about urban spaces? There are already projects, such as *Animal Aided Design*, aimed at including residing animals into the planning phase of urban design (Hauck & Weisser 2019: 7). Ideas include the integration of different species of birds into residential areas via holistic concepts that incorporate suitable nesting possibilities, watering places, dust bathing areas, and the cultivation of plants for adequate nutrition as well as promoting insect occurrence (ibid.: 37). Similar concepts by the same authors exist also for hedgehogs (ibid.: 41). Comparable ideas could also be utilized to incorporate domestic animals into (sub-)urban areas. As aforementioned, one could think of feeding places and shelters, but also of wallows for pigs or covered dust bathing areas for chickens.

A general objection to including domestic species into areas also populated by humans regards safety aspects for both sides. Animals could be harmed by traffic (Meijer 2017: 121-122), while humans could be harmed by animals who feel threatened or otherwise infringed upon. While negotiations about space and other aspects of everyday life will

probably be unavoidable, there will also be a getting-to-know phase in the beginning. Therefore, D&K call for basic socialization, whereby "[e]xisting members must pass on the basic skills and knowledge that […] newcomers will need to fit in and flourish" (2011: 123). This could first be done by humans but would later on be undertaken also by animal members, who would instruct others as to how to live within their community (Blattner et al. 2020: 11). Of course there can also be exclusion zones, where either (certain) animals or humans have no right to enter and therefore serve as a place to retreat. Similarly, no one would have to allow domestic animals in their private yards, and if individual animals cannot be safely integrated and continue to pose a threat, they could be relocated to a different space with more restricted mobility options (D&K 2011: 130). Also, depending on the implementation of spatial design, some areas would be more likely to be sought out by certain animals while others might not be frequented and animals could thus also be guided in and around the community, if these designs are cleverly incorporated. When it comes to dangers like traffic, basic socialization will give animals the possibility to cope with some of it, but there are also ideas like banning car traffic from inner cities and instead implementing public transport that operates on an upper level, for example a suspended railway, like the one in Wuppertal, Germany (Paul & Müller 2018: 31).

Even though the future of domesticated animals has not been decided yet, I illustrated two possible scenarios, favoring a continued co-existence over the extinction of all species of these animals. By applying the principles of the *intentional community* model, we could integrate domestic animals also into larger communities and not simply segregate them at FASes until they have gone extinct. As one can see, these principles do not only hold up for domestic animals, but can also be used when thinking about living with non-domesticated species in a true interspecies society and are open to further ideas as to how they could be applied when building this future society.

6 Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to examine whether and in what ways FASes provide justice to their resident animals and how the two sanctuary models proposed by D&K compare in regard to this. After thoroughly analyzing the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future, I conclude that both models have the potential to provide justice to their residents, but that there are also some significant differences regarding some of their principles. Therefore, I will subsequently give a short summary of each dimension as well as point to the most relevant differences.

Past

When it comes to injustices that happened during a resident's past, FASes can counter them by offering compensation. To illustrate how, I outlined three possible losses: health and bodily integrity, offspring, and freedom. While both models are equally well equipped to restore health by providing veterinary care and allowing for recovery in a suitable environment, practices in line with the *Non-perpetuation* principle of *refuge + advocacy* FASes, like castration, might be a violation of justice. The same applies to the abortion of offspring if residents arrive at the sanctuary pregnant. Regarding freedom of movement, both models can offer sufficient mobility, while the *intentional community* model's principle of *Scaffolded choices and reconfigured spaces* could additionally aid those who are afraid of too much of it. When it comes to those farm animals that never made it to a sanctuary, it would be possible for both models to symbolically compensate them, even though it is currently rarely done.

Due to the fact that some authors see compensation as being insufficient to make up for all the injustices endured by domesticated animals, additional measures are needed. Therefore, I examined the concept of moral repair, which aims to repair or establish a moral relationship between (former) offenders and victims. Here, I highlighted the special role that farmers can play if they decide to turn their farms into a sanctuary and also how moral repair could be an important measure to address the historical injustice of domestication. While the *refuge + advocacy* model can do critical work by educating people about the horrors of animal faming

and also by caring for its residents and healing relationships on an individual level, those doing the work also need to be careful to not instrumentalize the residents and check their intentions when engaging in sanctuary work. Therefore, the *intentional community* model seems to be better suited to actually address the ruptured moral relationship between humans and animals, because it meets the residents at eye level and creates a community where all members share an equal status.

Overall, both models can do great work when righting injustice endured by their residents in the past. However, the *refuge + advocacy* model is at risk of recreating injustice with their principle of *Non-perpetuation*, while the *intentional community* model has a valuable advantage with regard to repairing the moral relationship between animals and humans.

Present

By ensuring the residents' well-being, FASes can do the work of justice in the present. Therefore, I took a closer look at the three most prominent theories of well-being and rejected a purely hedonistic account, because well-being is about more than mere pleasure and pain. I also rejected a desire-fulfillment theory, as desires can also be harmful—with domestic animals especially, we need to be careful, since domestication altered their desires in compliance with human ideas. Hence, I proposed an objective list theory and created a list of four goods that benefit animals independently of their desires, are not bound to any species-norm, and share that they were withheld from residents during their time within the agricultural system. These four values were freedom, friendship, political participation, and meaning.

When it comes to freedom, animals have an interest not to be interfered with, restrained, or have their control over their actions taken away. While the *refuge + advocacy* model emphasizes freedom from exploitation through their principle of *Non-exploitation*, it also runs the risk of prioritizing safety over autonomy—which might be warranted to a certain extent—but matters should be carefully weighed when making decisions. The *intentional community*

model, on the other hand, tries to alleviate these risks through their principles of *Self-determination* and the *Absence of fixed hierarchical relationships*.

At most sanctuaries, animals can closely bond with members of their own species. However, the possibility for contact with individuals of other species (including humans) and the resulting creation of friendships strongly depends on spatial sanctuary design and its visitor policy. Here, *refuge + advocacy* FASes might stress safety and segregate species—especially smaller ones. Also, hierarchical relationships between staff and residents could inhibit true friendship formation. The *intentional community* model might be able to create more opportunity and choice here, as hierarchies are broken up and members are seen as equal.

To establish animals as political agents with the capacity for political participation, it is important to listen and not simply refer to them as voiceless. Also, framing acts of resistance as political acts or granting animals visibility in the public sphere might help with establishing political agency. At *refuge + advocacy* FASes, framing residents as ambassadors could serve to see them as political agents, while the principle of *Dependent agency* at *intentional community* FASes could aid in decision-making processes. Nevertheless, more needs to be done in both models to truly hear what animals have to say and make their voices count.

By intentionally and effortfully engaging in acts that lead to outcomes an animal cares about, she can generate meaning in her life. Possible acts are therefore creating friendships, caring for offspring, or working. The *refuge + advocacy model* limits the latter—via its principle of *Non-exploitation*, as it fears to create exploitative working conditions, as well as the caring for offspring, through its principle of *Non-perpetuation*. The *intentional community* model generally allows for all of these ways of creating meaning and could even further meaning-making activities for individual animals through its principle of *Dependent agency*.

Thus, both models can potentially provide justice in the present via well-being to their residents, with the *refuge + advocacy* model having some limitations when enacting these four values because of its strict definition of *Non-exploitation* and hierarchical thinking, and

the i*ntentional community* model leaving more room for enabling these goods through encouraging animals' agency.

Future

For the dimension of the future, I discussed two scenarios as candidates for a world without animal agriculture. The first was extinctionism and the second, interspecies communities. While current FASes seem to favor an extinctionist approach, which would bring about the end to all domesticated animals, I argued that it is not a just solution with regard to common arguments concerning animal suffering, exploitation, and dependency. Instead, I proposed that interspecies communities aimed at a continued co-existence of humans and domestic nonhumans inside of shared communities would be a more just future scenario. To achieve this, I applied the *intentional community* model's principles to interspecies communities, which can be envisioned as a broader conception of a sanctuary.

In this chapter, I also focused on the *refuge + advocacy* model's principle of *Non-perpetuation*, because it appeared to play a key role with regard to deciding the future of domestic animals. On the one hand, for extinctionism it is especially important, as it would be used as the tool to bring about extinction. On the other hand, it interferes with animals' freedom, agency, and bodily integrity, and continues to alter their behaviors and desires in accordance with human needs. Therefore, any future scenario committed to justice would need to carefully assess whether, when, and what reproductive control would be warranted, but should also grant domestic animals more *Self-determination*, as does the *intentional community* model.

After summarizing the main chapters and pointing out important differences with regard to the two models' principles, I will now briefly elaborate on the relevance of my work, related future research topics, and also give a short call to action.

Relevance

By thoroughly analyzing how the two models of FASes are contributing to justice regarding their domesticated residents, I detected some shortcomings, especially concerning the *Non-perpetuatio*n principle of *refuge + advocacy* sanctuaries. Also, I scrutinized how the two models can contribute to different areas that are relevant to justice, like compensation, moral repair, and values connected to an objective list theory of well-being, all of which have not been analyzed in this context before. Through this analysis, I could also contribute new ideas of how sanctuaries can engage in practices related to the aforementioned areas, for example by symbolically compensating anonymous animals through memorials or by having farmers, who are directly connected to these animals by working with them on a daily basis, engage in the work of moral repair.

Future Work

To follow up on my work regarding justice and FASes, I am proposing three topics of research—one for each dimension. The first topic, which strikes me as especially interesting, is concerned with farmers who turned their farms into sanctuaries. Here, one could examine how farmers and animals as well as their relationship are impacted by this change and how it contributes to the work of moral repair. Related to well-being and political participation, there is the question of what domestic animals are saying regarding matters that concern them and finding a methodology that could be used to study their voices at FASes. Lastly, it would be incredibly fascinating to design an interspecies community and actually bring it into being in order to see how humans and domesticated species could live together, what challenges arise, and how it might also be very different from anything that we can imagine right now.

Call to Action

After reading my thesis, I hope that I could convince you that animal farming presents an ongoing injustice, which is corrupting our relationship to domesticated farm animals and urgently needs to be terminated in order to conquer the divide that domestication has initially

created between us. We share a duty of responsibility to move towards a future in which animals are treated justly and to not repeat the injustices of our past and present. Therefore, I would love for this thesis to spawn visions and initiate discussions about such a future so that our world can eventually become a sanctuary for everybody.

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